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Trump’s transactional approach, relying heavily on tariffs, has secured short-term wins – such as Mexico deploying 10,000 guardsmen, Panama withdrawing from the Belt and Road Initiative, Brazil’s announcement to shelve plans for the creation of a common currency with fellow BRICs+ members, and Colombia resuming migrant repatriation flights. However, his inflammatory remarks – like “We don’t need Latin America” during his second inauguration address and a pledge to reclaim the Panama Canal – threaten to erode decades of regional goodwill and cede influence to U.S. competitors at a time of global realignment.

Paradoxically, with Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, Michael Waltz as National Security Advisor, and Mauricio Claver-Carone as Special Envoy, Trump’s administration may be the most Latin America-focused in modern times. Rubio’s first overseas trip to Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic underscored this emphasis. Can Trump engage constructively with Latin America, to the benefit of American voters and businesses, or is conflict inevitable?

Changes in U.S. Policy Toward Latin America Under the Trump Administration

The Trump administration’s early policy toward Latin America marks a clear departure from past U.S. involvement in the region, embracing a more transactional and frequently confrontational stance. Key executive actions, such as freezing foreign aid to important regional allies, undermining the UMSCA, redesignating Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, and instructing the Department of Homeland Security to reassess Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations, have underscored a shift away from the multilateral initiatives pursued by past administrations.

U.S.-Colombia relations stand out as a notable example of a partnership that has been particularly impacted by Trump’s return to office. Colombian President Gustavo Petro – who has consistently used anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric while relying on and benefiting from U.S. foreign aid, security assistance, and market access via its trade agreement with the US – was the Trump administration’s first target. Indeed, the U.S. threatened to impose tariffs and visa sanctions on Colombia after Petro initially refused to accept repatriation flights. However, Petro swiftly reversed his position, leading to a negotiated agreement. Still, the Trump administration’s executive order to reevaluate and realign U.S. foreign aid – including a 90-day freeze on most assistance – has led to the grounding of U.S.-origin 30 Black Hawk helicopters used by the Colombian National Police and Army, disrupting critical counternarcotics operations and efforts to combat organized armed groups. This development is particularly challenging for Colombia as it grapples with soaring cocaine production, a worsening humanitarian crisis in the region of Catatumbo, and violent clashes between the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the General Staff of Blocks and Fronts (EMBF), a dissident faction of the FARC-EP.

Beyond Colombia, key flashpoints include threats to the sovereignty of the Panama Canal – despite a conservative Panamanian government keen to work with the U.S. on migration – and threats of military intervention in Mexico to counter growing state capture by cartels. Additionally, tariff pressures on Mexico, the U.S.’s top trading partner and with which the U.S. ran a $172 billion trade deficit last year, have further strained regional relations and introduced high levels of uncertainty and concern among investors, which could worsen if Trump levies tariffs on Mexico in a more lasting fashion.

On the other hand, several Latin American leaders, such as Argentina’s Javier Milei, Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa, Paraguay’s Santiago Peña, and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele – who share personal affinities with Trump – have high hopes for his presidency. However, it remains uncertain whether this will result in tangible policy victories for their countries. For example, the imposition of a 25 percent global tariff on aluminum and steel imports is expected to impact Argentina significantly. In 2024, Argentina exported $500 million in aluminum and $100 million in steel.

Is There a Long-Term U.S. Strategy in the Region?

For decades, the U.S. has lacked a coherent strategy toward Latin America, and the Trump administration’s vision remains unclear beyond curbing illegal migration and drug trafficking. A more strategic, mutually beneficial approach – centered on economic investment, security cooperation, and mutual respect – could enhance U.S. security and competitiveness while promoting regional stability. Strengthening local institutions and fostering growth would help address migration and trafficking at their roots while countering China’s influence. Notably, the administration has more high-level regional expertise than at any point in its modern history.

Encouraging U.S. private sector investment is also critical for both Latin America’s development and America’s long-term economic interests. Rubio and Claver-Carone were initial supporters of the Americas Act, a bipartisan bill that sought both to counter Chinese influence while rewarding and solidifying trade partnerships with countries in the region. The logic is that expanding and encouraging investment would create new opportunities in Latin America, offer an alternative to Chinese manufacturing, and complement U.S. reshoring efforts.

However, Trump’s protectionist rhetoric and early trade policies risk deterring U.S. businesses from looking southward at a time when companies are already reassessing their supply chains in response to tariffs and export controls targeting China. Indeed, although in his first presidency Trump renegotiated the USMCA, today the imposition of arbitrary trade tariffs not only erodes the USMCA but also threatens decades of effective economic and political regional integration. Moreover, it remains unclear what will be the fate of the Americas Act, which directs the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to negotiate with USMCA partners for the inclusion of Americas Partnership countries in an expanded USMCA+, and temporarily extend the Caribbean Basin Trade Preference Area to these countries until full USMCA membership can be achieved.

Claver-Carone has mentioned transforming the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) into a private equity-style fund to attract private capital, particularly for energy and infrastructure projects in smaller countries in Latin America. His strategy emphasizes shifting away from debt-based financing to ensure the U.S. and its partners have a direct stake in investments that might attract increased U.S. private sector interest once they see that the government is taking a more vested stake in the region.

While the administration’s regional expertise is unquestionable, what strategy they may follow remains unclear. Moreover, besides the regional economic agenda other pressing questions arise: What is the administration’s strategy for dealing with the regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela? Will the US look to build regional consensus against these regimes, reminiscent of its support for the Lima Group, or seek to deal with them unilaterally? During his first presidency, Trump launched an unsuccessful ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against Maduro’s regime. However, now his administration has not only reestablished communication channels with Maduro’s government but has also promised to send approximately 350,000 Venezuelans – many of whom fled political persecution and economic hardship – back to the regime they escaped from. The perils of continuing without a clear and consistent strategy risk the U.S. perpetually ceding economic and geopolitical influence in the region to its great power rivals.

Is Trump a Modern Day McKinley?

Trump’s vision for Latin America remains ambiguous – deprioritizing alliances and trade while framing himself as a modern-day McKinley, ready to use military and economic leverage to reassert U.S. dominance. Indeed, President William McKinley’s (1897-1901) economic strategy centered on high tariffs to protect American manufacturers and fund the government, although he later began advocating for freer trade to expand U.S. exports before his assassination in 1901. Trump has stated his admiration for McKinley calling him the “tariff king” and shared McKinley’s earlier vision for an American economy propped up by protectionism, but with a more nationalist focus on renegotiating trade deals and restricting immigration, particularly with Latin America. McKinley’s legacy in Latin America is one of expansionism, as he pushed the U.S. to intervene in Cuba, seize Puerto Rico, and purchase or otherwise acquire lands in Panama to construct a canal connecting the Atlantic to the Pacific.

While regional leaders remain interested in working with the U.S., Trump’s use of coercive foreign policy to address domestic priorities risks eroding confidence and narrowing the regional cooperation agenda. His withdrawal from the Paris Agreement for a second time has sent discouraging signals, especially on climate resilience and disaster aid. Questions also remain about continued funding for key initiatives like the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative and the Haiti stabilization mission – likely to be assessed through a “What’s in it for the U.S.?” lens.

Whether Trump is a modern-day McKinley or not, the reality is that the region’s economies and leaders’ political interests are dramatically different from those of McKinley’s time. Indeed, while Trump has threatened to take control of the Panama Canal and use military force in Mexico, late last year, Chinese President Xi Jinping, alongside Peruvian President Dina Boluarte, inaugurated the $3.6 billion Chancay megaport, of which Chinese state-owned enterprise Cosco Shipping contributed $1.2 billion for a 60 percent stake and promises to boost regional trade. Earlier this month, Cosco Shipping likewise opened a new shipping route directly to Colombia, which celebrated the development as “a great step in strengthening trade relations between Colombia and China.” The contrast between each rival power’s approach to the region could not be more striking.

Unless the administration delivers concrete economic benefits to willing partners and admirers like Argentina and El Salvador, U.S. influence in the region will remain fragile, likely ceding increasing space to China. Opportunities for security and economic benefits to the U.S. abound in Latin America. To capitalize on these, the administration should adopt a measured and strategic approach, leveraging the expertise of regional specialists like Rubio and Claver-Carone rather than resorting to public coercion of valuable partners.

Joseph Cain is a graduate of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. Formerly, he was a research intern at Global Americans.

Alejandro Trenchi is a Political Science PhD candidate at the University of Florida. Formerly, he was Director of Research and Programs at Global Americans.

Image Source: REUTERS/Yves Herman/File Photo.

After a quarter of a century of negotiations marked by numerous challenges, stalls, and setbacks, the European Union and the South American trade bloc Mercosur have finally signed their long-awaited trade agreement. The deal aims to integrate trade between both regions, creating a combined market of 700 million consumers. While uncertainty over its ratification still looms large, there is growing momentum on both sides of the Atlantic, sparking cautious optimism about its future.

Amid growing global protectionism and political tensions, the agreement promises to unlock significant opportunities for both regions, whose economic growth has been sluggish for years. On one side of the agreement, Brazil and Argentina, Mercosur’s economic heavyweights, have yet to fully recover from the boom-to-bust cycle triggered by the commodities-driven growth of the late 2000s. Additionally, the Covid-19 pandemic had a profound impact on the region, creating long-lasting challenges that hinder efforts to reduce poverty and inequality. On the other side of the Atlantic, the European Union’s persistently low growth rates since the turn of the century continue to confound policymakers. A recent report, commissioned by the EU and led by celebrated economist and former Italian prime minister Mario Draghi, highlights that productivity remains one of the bloc’s most pressing challenges — since 2000, the EU’s per capita real disposable income has grown at half the rate of the U.S. The analysis stresses the need for the EU to pursue inclusive economic growth, with a focus on sustainable competitiveness, economic security, open strategic autonomy, and fair competition.

In this context, the agreement, whose main terms were agreed in 2019 but later revised due to political pressure from the EU’s agricultural sector and environmental activists, presents an opportunity for strategic economic sectors in both Mercosur and the EU. Indeed, the agreement positions Mercosur’s agricultural sector and EU’s industrial sector to significantly increase their productivity. With its approval, Mercosur will eliminate tariffs on 72 percent of imports within 10 years or less, while the EU will do so for 92 percent of imports over the same period. Among the expected beneficiaries of the EU are: agri-food products; machinery; pharmaceuticals; cars; textiles and clothing, as well as business, financial, and logistics services. Mercosur’s expected beneficiaries are: food and beverage manufacturing; textiles, apparel, and leather products; and forestry and fishing.

In addition to its economic potential, the agreement also has a political dimension, with strengthening EU-Mercosur ties remaining a key priority. In the context of an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape, as the U.S. and China sink further into a zero-sum great power politics struggle, the EU-Mercosur deal underscores a renewed commitment to the international liberal rules-based order, where free trade, democracy, sustainable development, and human rights serve as guiding principles.

While Mercosur remains a dysfunctional trade bloc, with differing views on its structure—whether it should operate as a free trade area allowing individual trade deals or function as a unified trade union—there is consensus that this deal represents an opportunity. Indeed, it is expected that it will be easily approved in each of the bloc’s member states countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay).

From the European perspective, this agreement emerges during a period of strategic reflection on the organization’s international role amidst internal fragmentation. With France and Germany, traditionally the driving forces behind European development, grappling with significant political and economic crises, the deal comes at a pivotal moment for the European Union to define its course in addressing global challenges. The ongoing economic slowdown and political instability cast doubt on the EU’s ability to present a cohesive strategy in its dealings with Mercosur, potentially affecting not only the ratification process but also Europe’s reputation as a reliable and unified global actor.

Thus, through this landmark trade agreement, the EU has sought to introduce its distinct mark within the framework of one of the three pillars of the negotiation: cooperation. Key initiatives, such as the Global Gateway, through which the EU has committed to investing approximately 1.8 billion euros in the initial years of the agreement, highlight the organization’s determination to position itself as a global leader in the green transition and its accompanying policies.

To advance the agreement, it is crucial to reinforce the most influential elements required for its implementation. Importantly, the intricate workings of the European Union have effectively divided the treaty into two components: a more broadly supported component addressing economic and trade matters, and a more divisive component on political dialogue and cooperation frameworks. This division stems from the EU’s competences’ structure, necessitating separate ratification processes, and thus enabling a smooth implementation of the economic heart of the treaty regardless of the lengthier implementation process for its political frameworks.

The economic and trade portion requires approval from both the European Council and the European Parliament. In the Council, member states are represented by their respective Trade Ministers and opposition from France, Poland, and Austria — driven by domestic political and commercial concerns — may pose a challenge. Blocking the agreement would require the support of at least four member states representing 35 percent of the EU’s population — a threshold unlikely to be met without securing backing from a major member like Italy. Once the Council approves the agreement, it will move to the European Parliament, where the European People’s Party’s leading coalition is expected to facilitate its passage without significant obstacles.

Following ratification, the trade agreement would take effect, with gradual implementation expected to begin within approximately a year. Meanwhile, the political and cooperation components will follow separate ratification paths through national parliaments, potentially delaying the full implementation of the treaty for several years. If successfully enacted, the EU would establish trade agreements covering 94 percent of Latin America’s GDP, significantly outpacing the United States (44 percent) and China (14 percent). This would represent a substantial boost to the EU’s efforts to retain its global influence in an increasingly competitive geopolitical landscape.

Alejandro Trenchi is a Political Science PhD candidate at the University of Florida. Formerly, he was Director of Research and Programs at Global Americans.

Miguel Ángel Melián is a Public Affairs Consultant with expertise in international politics and diplomacy. Formerly, he contributed to Global Americans in research and program development.

Image Source: Dante Fernandez/AFP.

On November 24, closing this year’s hectic electoral cycle in the Western Hemisphere, Uruguayans will go to the polls one more time. The run-off election will define who will govern the country for the next five years. Voters will choose between Yamandú Orsi, of the center-left Frente Amplio and Álvaro Delgado, of the center-right Partido Nacional. While the country’s democratic institutions and rule of law remain robust and resilient, it would be misleading to believe that Uruguay is immune to the political instability and polarization rampant throughout the region.

This year’s elections in the region has demonstrated that when the political establishment fails to address fundamental issues or struggles to communicate effectively, frustrated voters turn to disruptive political outsiders. While this is not new in Latin America, Uruguay should pay close attention. Uruguayans should not be forced into the false choice between preserving democratic institutions and the rule of law and addressing critical issues like crime reduction, as seen in other parts of the region. While the temptation of quick solutions is strong, history has demonstrated that populist shortcuts ultimately bring more long-term costs than benefits.

On October 27, an overwhelming majority of Uruguayans signaled that they are not ready to support populist adventures that could undermine the country’s rule of law or fiscal stability. Both the rejection of the social security plebiscite and the proposed modification of the constitution to allow nighttime police raids sent a clear message in this direction. Indeed, nearly 60 percent of the Uruguayan electorate voted against the attractive but fiscally irresponsible offer of lowering the retirement age from 65 back to 60 and linking pensions to the national minimum wage. Likewise, while insecurity is the main concern for Uruguayans, a similar proportion of the electorate refused to trade their constitutional rights for the presumed security improvement of nighttime police raids.

So, why should Uruguay pay attention to what is happening in the region despite this?

Nearly 40 years after Uruguay’s re-democratization process, the country’s political system is amid a historic generational shift. Indeed, this electoral cycle marked the first since 1985 in which none of the political heavyweights (from both left and right) of the last four decades ran for the presidency, senate or even congress. While some of them have already passed away, including former presidents Jorge Batlle and Tabaré Vázquez, as well as Frente Amplio’s leading economist Danilo Astori, others are advanced in age, such as former presidents José Mujica, Julio María Sanguinetti, and Luis Alberto Lacalle, and have made the choice to step aside for younger colleagues.

Although to varying degrees, these politicians had a common trait: while in office, they were able to build consensus across different political factions, moderating political extremes, and prioritizing the political center. Indeed, Uruguay’s model, characterized by strong democratic institutions, the rule of law, and a free market economy with robust safety nets that prevent high inequality, is largely shaped by the political decisions of these leaders. Although generational changes are natural and desirable, these transitions generate instability, as in the turbulent 1960s. Apart from President Luis Lacalle Pou, it remains unclear who, if anyone, will be the “political heavyweights” of Uruguay’s future.

Moreover, Uruguay is likely entering into a new formally bipartisan age. The October 27 election results rang warning bells in the center-right governing coalition. While the center-right coalition parties all-together obtained 47 percent of the vote and the center-left Frente Amplio 44 percent, the coalition lost the majority in lower and upper chambers and Frente Amplio regained a majority in the senate. Indeed, the country’s electoral system favors the largest political party, and the center-right coalition misses clear political opportunities due to its fragmentation. It is expected that in the next five years there will be intense negotiations to create a new political party that will host the historical rivals Partido Nacional and Partido Colorado – two of the oldest political parties in the world – among others. How it will play out, however, remains to be seen.

In this context, the next administration, without a majority in congress, will have to address some key social problems that neither the center-left nor center-right, due to different circumstances, were able to tackle before. Insecurity and the cost of living will likely remain a top priority for the next administration. Today, insecurity in Uruguay is fueled by the inroads made by organized crime over the past few decades, which threaten both social cohesion and democratic institutions. Contributing factors include porous borders, a crumbling and overcrowded correctional system, and a failing education system. On the other hand, Uruguay’s cost of living is staggering. While the country has one of the highest per capita incomes in the region, it is also one of the most expensive countries in the world, surpassing even advanced economies like the United Kingdom and Germany. Uruguayans pay 80 percent more for basic goods than Mexicans and 20 percent more than their neighbors, Argentina and Brazil.

The unavoidable generational shift, the realignment of the political parties, and the presumed new age of formal bipartisanship, as well as the pressing social issues facing Uruguayans, represent a significant challenge for the country. How the system absorbs and responds to these challenges will very likely determine if Uruguay’s current model will survive or if Uruguay will be forced to build a new governing model for its future.

Alejandro Trenchi is a Political Science PhD candidate at the University of Florida. Formerly, he was Director of Research and Programs at Global Americans.

Global Americans takes pride in serving as a platform that offers in-depth analyses on various political, economic, environmental, and foreign affairs issues in the Western Hemisphere. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Global Americans or anyone associated with it, and publication by Global Americans does not constitute an endorsement of all or any part of the views expressed.