Image Source: The Buenos Aires Herald.
The 2025 geopolitical calendar has been undoubtedly shaped by Donald Trump’s return to the White House. Following a four-year hiatus, the Republican leader was returned to power on January 20th, leaving business and political leaders worldwide facing significant uncertainty over his agenda. From looming tariff threats to his controversial expansionist rhetoric, decision-makers everywhere are closely watching to see what surprises Trump 2.0 will bring.
In Buenos Aires, however, the mood is notably different. Unlike other global leaders, the prevailing sentiment at the Casa Rosada is one of marked optimism. While the arrivals of Biden in 2021 and Obama in 2009, to name a few examples, were well-received by the administrations of the time, current expectations for U.S.-Argentina relations under the Milei administration are substantially higher. Nonetheless, it is crucial to critically assess the foundations of this optimism.
A key factor is the personal rapport between Javier Milei and Donald Trump, evidenced by mutual praise and frequent meetings the leaders have held in recent months. Milei regards Trump as his role model in international politics, and the U.S. president has expressed admiration for his Argentine counterpart. Personal chemistry, as demonstrated in Trump ‘s relationship with Mexico’s Andrés Manuel López Obrador, is an important element for maintaining stable relations given Trump’s more personalist approach to foreign policy.
Another driver of optimism in Argentina is the presumed renewed interest Trump has in the region, given the centrality of issues like migration and drug trafficking during his campaign. However, Trump has signaled that he views the region more as a problem than as an opportunity. Therefore, more “sticks” than “carrots” are to be expected in U.S. foreign policy towards the region. The nomination of Florida’s Senator, the hispanic ‘hawk’ Marco Rubio, indicates a focus on confronting regional autocracies like Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, reinforcing the administration’s negative agenda towards the region.
Furthermore, it should not be assumed that Washington’s strategic view of Latin America is that of a unified bloc stretching from the Rio Grande to the Strait of Magellan. On the contrary, the focus will likely remain on what Argentine scholar Roberto Russell calls “Northern Latin America,” which includes Mexico, the Caribbean, Colombia, and Venezuela. This northern region, more “turbulent” for U.S. interests, will likely maintain Washington’s attention, as the Southern Cone occupies the secondary position it has historically held.
Indeed, the power disparity between the United States and Argentina, combined with Trump’s traditionally transactional diplomatic style, makes it difficult to foresee significant incentives for Washington to seek substantial cooperation with Buenos Aires. Brazil’s experience during Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency serves as a cautionary tale: ideological alignment and close personal ties with Trump did not translate into significant benefits, despite Brazil’s greater geopolitical relevance to the U.S.
Is this necessarily bad for Milei’s Argentina? Not entirely. If the region is to receive primarily negative attention, staying on the sidelines could be advantageous. Additionally, Argentina has reasons for optimism on key issues, such as political support in its legal dispute over the nationalization of the YPF energy company or in unlocking new IMF aid and resources.As for the prospect of a free trade agreement, it seems unlikely at present due to several factors, including Mercosur’s restrictive policies and the lack of complementarity between their economies, despite the Milei government’s rhetoric.
Argentina’s path to sustained economic recovery will require, apart from significant domestic reforms, a pragmatic foreign policy strategy that aligns with its development priorities. The United States can undoubtedly be a valuable partner in this process, and Trump’s presidency certainly offers opportunities for collaboration. Nevertheless, managing expectations will be critical.
Buenos Aires must recognize the limitations of personal diplomacy and ideological alignment in achieving substantive outcomes. By anchoring its optimism in realism, Milei’s Argentina can better navigate the challenges – and better capitalize the opportunities – of the U.S.-Argentina relations during this period.
Fernando Prats is a Programme Director at London Politica’s Latin America Programme.