A Model for Expansive, Differentiated Diaspora Engagement

For decades, the relationship between Latin American and Caribbean countries and their communities abroad has been understood primarily through two highly visible dimensions: the remittances migrants send home, and the consular services governments provide to them. Both are essential. Remittances sustain households, finance education and health expenditures, support consumption, and provide many countries with a resilient source of external income. Consular services, meanwhile, protect citizens abroad, facilitate documentation, and help migrants navigate legal and administrative systems in their countries of residence. However, neither remittance statistics nor consular activity captures the full range of contributions that diaspora communities can make.

Migrants and their descendants also participate in professional, entrepreneurial, scientific, academic, civic, and institutional networks. These networks can facilitate investment, entrepreneurship, trade, knowledge circulation, and cooperation between institutions in countries of origin and residence; reduce informational and transactional barriers; connect businesses with foreign markets; and make specialized knowledge available across borders. These contributions do not necessarily require permanent return by migrants to their country of origin.¹ Diaspora members can transfer expertise, create commercial connections, mentor entrepreneurs, support research, or participate in institutional initiatives while continuing to live abroad. Diaspora networks can therefore serve as bridges between global knowledge, professional expertise, and institutions in countries of origin.² 

Recognizing this broader contribution is an important first step. However, it must also be recognized that Latin American and Caribbean communities in the United States differ significantly in population size, geographic concentration, household income, educational attainment, occupational profile, citizenship, migration history, English proficiency, and institutional development. Policies that recognize the importance of diasporas yet treat these communities as essentially interchangeable risk replacing one incomplete model with another.

Therefore, the next generation of diaspora policy must move beyond two limitations at once. It must move beyond remittance-centered conceptions of diaspora contributions and beyond one-size-fits-all engagement.

Measuring Remittances, Missing the Networks Behind Them

Remittances are relatively easy to observe. Governments, central banks, international organizations, and financial institutions can estimate how much money enters a country, where it comes from, and how those flows change over time. By contrast, the value of professional and institutional networks is more difficult to measure.

Remittance figures do not capture business opportunities identified through a migrant entrepreneur, an exporter introduced to a foreign distributor, a research partnership between universities, or specialized advice from a professional living abroad. They do not measure knowledge transferred, companies established in countries of residence, technologies introduced, or institutional relationships developed across borders.  Research on migrant networks helps explain why these less visible connections matter. 

Javorcik, Özden, Spatareanu, and Neagu (2011) found that migrant networks can facilitate foreign direct investment by improving information flows and supporting the credibility of cross-border relationships. Migrants may possess knowledge of both their countries of origin and residence, including language, business practices, regulatory conditions, potential partners, and market opportunities. This knowledge can reduce some of the costs and uncertainties that affect international transactions.³

Research on skilled diasporas similarly shows that countries can draw on talent abroad through flexible forms of participation.  Professional and knowledge networks may contribute through mentoring, institutional collaboration, entrepreneurship, investment, and what is sometimes described as knowledge circulation rather than permanent physical return.⁴ 

The proposition is not that remittances have been overvalued. Their economic and social importance is undeniable. Rather, remittance-centered analysis provides an incomplete picture of the relationship between diasporas and their countries of origin. Accounting for the full value brought by the diaspora requires more than a dollar figure.

Diaspora Communities Have Distinct Profiles

A comparative diagnosis of nine selected Latin American and Caribbean communities in the United States illustrates why broader engagement must also be differentiated.

The analysis examined Venezuelan, Chilean, Peruvian, Costa Rican, Panamanian, Dominican, Ecuadorian, Colombian, and Guatemalan populations across Florida, New York, New Jersey, Texas, and Connecticut. Using U.S. Census Bureau data,⁵ it covered household income, per capita income, educational attainment, poverty, labor-force participation, homeownership, citizenship, foreign-born share, English proficiency, population size, and geographic concentration.⁶ 

The analysis showed that the characteristics relevant to diaspora engagement do not necessarily align across the board. Some relatively small communities may combine comparatively high levels of educational attainment, professional integration, or household income. Their potential relevance may therefore lie less in demographic scale than in specialized expertise, business connections, mentoring, or investment.

While larger and more geographically concentrated communities may possess greater market visibility and potentially stronger conditions for collective organization, population size and concentration do not by themselves establish political influence. Evidence of organizations, civic participation, leadership, voter engagement, representation, and coalition-building would be required before drawing that conclusion.

Newer communities may include substantial professional or entrepreneurial capabilities without yet having developed consolidated institutions or recognized networks through which those capabilities can be mobilized.

These distinctions require methodological discipline. Census data supplies the underlying estimates. The grouping of variables into broader dimensions is the author’s analytical framework. Any conclusion concerning a community’s potential contribution, political influence, institutional maturity, or willingness to participate remains an inference that must be corroborated through additional evidence.⁷

Diasporas are internally diverse, and averages cannot describe every person within them. At the same time, such analyses demonstrate that demographic scale, human capital, economic position, geographic concentration, and institutional development are each different dimensions of diaspora activity. Public policy should not assume that they are interchangeable.

The Policy Gap Is Not an Absence of Policy

Latin American and Caribbean countries have adopted a wide range of policies toward their citizens abroad. Comparative research covering 22 countries documents measures related to consular administration, documentation, political rights, social protection, economic policy, institutional participation, return migration, and the governmental institutions responsible for diaspora affairs. The same research reveals considerable variation in the density, scope, and configuration of those policies.⁸

Migrants may require documentation, consular protection, legal support, social services, recognition of qualifications, or assistance maintaining connections with their countries of origin. The argument for differentiated engagement is not an argument for abandoning these responsibilities.

The problem emerges when traditional instruments are treated as the complete diaspora agenda or applied without sufficient regard to the different profiles, capacities, and priorities of diaspora communities.

The European Union Global Diaspora Facility’s regional analysis similarly identifies significant differences among Latin American and Caribbean countries in both policy priorities and the institutions created to address diaspora affairs. It finds no common regional strategy governing either the substance of diaspora engagement or its institutional architecture.⁹

This misalignment can take several forms. Professionally established communities may receive merely ceremonial engagement; small but economically positioned communities may be overlooked because of their size; large communities may be assumed to have political influence without evidence of organization or representation; and recently arrived or vulnerable communities may be treated as investment constituencies when protection, integration, or professional accreditation are more urgent.

These are analytical illustrations, not claims that every government or community exhibits the same pattern. They nevertheless show why engagement instruments should follow evidence rather than assumptions.

Institutional research reinforces this conclusion. Tittel-Mosser’s typology of diaspora engagement institutions finds no one-size-fits-all institutional model. Governments use different ministries, agencies, councils, consultative bodies, subnational institutions, diplomatic structures, and public-private arrangements. The appropriate architecture depends on national history, governmental priorities, available resources, institutional trust, decentralization, and the characteristics of the diaspora itself.¹⁰

The International Organization for Migration reaches a complementary conclusion from the perspective of diaspora mapping. Mapping should not be limited to counting migrants or determining where they live. It should examine their demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, skills, occupations, organizations, networks, interests, links to countries of origin, and possible forms of engagement.¹¹

Moving beyond remittances is necessary, but insufficient on its own. Governments must also move beyond undifferentiated engagement.

A Differentiated Portfolio of Engagement

A more effective approach would replace the expectation that one policy can serve every diaspora with a portfolio of instruments adapted to verified needs, capacities, networks, and stages of institutional development.

Four priorities should guide that transition:

1. Map capabilities, not only populations

Governments should begin with demographic and administrative data, but they should not stop there. A useful mapping exercise should also identify:

• Professional and technical skills.
• Entrepreneurial and investment experience.
• Academic and scientific expertise.
• Professional, business, and civic organizations.
• Leadership and institutional networks.
• Sectoral and geographic concentrations.
• Connections with public and private institutions.
• Interests and demonstrated willingness to participate.

The distinction between demographic analysis and actionable mapping is fundamental. Statistics may indicate that a community has high educational attainment, a concentration of professionals, or a significant entrepreneurial presence. However, they cannot identify the relevant individuals, determine whether they are connected with one another, establish whether organizations are active and representative, or reveal whether people are willing to participate in a particular initiative.

The IOM’s Diaspora Mapping Toolkit, drawing on extensive experience with diaspora-mapping exercises, treats mapping as a systematic and flexible evidence-gathering process.¹² It recommends defining clear research objectives and examining geographic distribution, demographic and socioeconomic profiles, professional skills, organizations, networks, interests, connections to countries of origin, and potential forms of engagement.¹³

Because these dimensions cannot be captured through official statistics alone, effective mapping must combine Census and administrative data with surveys, interviews, organizational records, professional directories, consultations, and network analysis. It should also include transparent mechanisms through which diaspora members can identify their expertise and indicate whether and how they are willing to participate.

2. Match instruments to verified community profiles

The principal policy contribution of a differentiated approach is segmentation. 

• Professional and academic networks may support mentoring, research collaboration, curriculum development, scientific exchange, and knowledge circulation. 
• Entrepreneurial networks may assist exporters, identify distributors, connect suppliers, facilitate commercial partnerships, and support market entry.
• Investment platforms may channel interest toward credible projects supported by reliable information, appropriate due diligence, sound governance, and investor protection.
• Established civic organizations may participate in public-policy dialogue, institutional consultation, and coalition-building.
• Newer communities may require support for leadership development, network formation, and organizational capacity.
• Communities experiencing vulnerability may need protection, documentation, integration, and access to services before more ambitious economic engagement initiatives become realistic.

Diasporas are internally heterogeneous. Segmentation should therefore consider not only nationality but also city, generation, profession, economic sector, migration history, socioeconomic position, legal status, organizational affiliation, and willingness to participate, rather than assigning an entire national-origin community permanently to one category.

The objective is not to determine which communities matter most. It is to stop assuming that every community should be engaged through the same instruments.

3. Build credible platforms

Diaspora engagement cannot rely principally on patriotic appeals, symbolic recognition, or isolated conferences. Affinity with a country of origin may generate interest, but it does not replace viable projects, reliable institutions, transparent processes, appropriate intermediaries, or investor protections. Research on diaspora direct investment emphasizes that emotional and personal connections may affect investment decisions, but they cannot eliminate the importance of the business environment, project quality, governance, and risk.¹⁴

The same principle applies beyond investment. Professionals need clearly defined opportunities to contribute. Researchers need credible institutional counterparts. Entrepreneurs need reliable commercial information and capable partners. Civic organizations need transparent channels through which participation can influence decisions.

Building these platforms is unlikely to be the responsibility of foreign ministries and consulates alone. The institutional ecosystem may include:

• Trade and investment-promotion agencies.
• Development banks.
• Chambers of commerce.
• Universities and research institutions.
• Local and regional governments.
• Private companies.
• Professional associations.
• Diaspora organizations.
• International cooperation institutions.

The role of government should not necessarily be to control every network. It should be to help create credible channels through which verified capabilities can be connected with clearly defined national and regional objectives.

4. Measure results

Diaspora programs are frequently assessed through indicators of activity: the number of conferences organized, participants registered, consular events held, or people contacted. These measures may be administratively useful, but they do not necessarily demonstrate results.

A differentiated engagement strategy should also measure:

• Investment mobilized.
• Businesses and professionals connected.
• Commercial opportunities generated.
• Export or market-entry processes supported.
• Research and knowledge partnerships established.
• Mentoring relationships created.
• Institutions and diaspora organizations strengthened.
• Professional or technical expertise mobilized.
• Projects completed or sustained over time.

These indicators are proposals, not established international standards, and their relevance will depend on the objectives of each policy or program.

The broader principle is nevertheless clear: governments should distinguish between convening people and creating measurable economic, professional, scientific, civic, or institutional outcomes.

From Counting People to Understanding Capacity

The next generation of diaspora policy should not be assessed only through remittance volumes, consular coverage, electoral participation, or the number of nationals registered abroad. These measures are important, but they should form part of a broader framework that asks whether governments can:

• Understand how their communities abroad differ.
• Distinguish observable characteristics from assumed capacity.
• Identify which organizations and networks actually exist.
• Determine which individuals and institutions are willing to participate.
• Select instruments appropriate to different community profiles.
• Connect verified capabilities with credible opportunities.
• Measure the results of that engagement.

International policy guidance has already emphasized that diaspora engagement should be linked to clearly defined development objectives, mapping, trust-building, and the mobilization of diaspora members as partners rather than treated as a separate or purely symbolic activity.¹⁵

Latin America and the Caribbean do not lack resources, talent, or networks abroad. Nor do their governments lack experience engaging emigrant populations. What remains underdeveloped is the evidence-based and differentiated institutional architecture required to connect the two.

The central challenge is no longer simply to recognize that diasporas can contribute beyond remittances. It is to understand that they contribute in different ways—and to build policies capable of recognizing and mobilizing those differences.

About the Author

Camilo Ayala-Patiño is a Colombian lawyer, former diplomat, international affairs professional, and business owner specializing in international trade, economic regulation, institutional strategy, and dispute resolution. He serves as Director of the Center for Conciliation, Arbitration, and Amicable Composition of the Cali Chamber of Commerce, where he leads the institution’s modernization, digital transformation, and internationalization strategy. He is also the co-founder and owner of Millán & Ayala, a consulting firm advising companies, exporters, investors, and institutions on international trade, regulatory compliance, market access, and business strategy, and a fellow at Global Americans.

Footnotes

¹ Kuznetsov, Y. (2006). Leveraging diasporas of talent: Toward a new policy agenda. In Y. Kuznetsov (Ed.), Diaspora networks and the international migration of skills: How countries can draw on their talent abroad (pp. 221–236). World Bank.
²  Kuznetsov, Y. (Ed.). (2006). Diaspora networks and the international migration of skills: How countries can draw on their talent abroad. World Bank.
³  Javorcik, B. S., Özden, Ç., Spatareanu, M., & Neagu, C. (2011). Migrant networks and foreign direct investment. Journal of Development Economics, 94(2), 231–241. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.01.012. An earlier version was published as World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4046 in 2006.
⁴  Kuznetsov, Leveraging diasporas of talent: Toward a new policy agenda, 1.
⁵ Principally the 2022 American Community Survey Selected Population Profile, Table S0201, together with Table B05006 and complementary ACS tables. The underlying demographic estimates were drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2022 American Community Survey.
⁶  U.S. Census Bureau. (2022). American Community Survey: Selected Population Profile in the United States, Table S0201; Place of Birth for the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, Table B05006; and complementary ACS tables. U.S. Department of Commerce.
⁷  Ayala, C. (2026, March). Mapeo estratégico de diásporas latinoamericanas en EE. UU.: Metodología del estudio demográfico [Unpublished methodological paper].
⁸  Pedroza, L., Palop, P., & Hoffmann, B. (2016). Emigrant policies in Latin America and the Caribbean. FLACSO-Chile.
⁹  Tittel-Mosser, F. (2021). Diaspora engagement: Latin America and the Caribbean. European Union Global Diaspora Facility.
¹⁰  Tittel-Mosser, F. (2021). Diaspora engagement: Latin America and the Caribbean. European Union Global Diaspora Facility.
¹¹  International Organization for Migration. (2022). Diaspora mapping toolkit. International Organization for Migration.
¹²  International Organization for Migration. (2022). Diaspora mapping toolkit. International Organization for Migration.
¹³  International Organization for Migration. (2022). Diaspora mapping toolkit. International Organization for Migration. See particularly the introductory framework and sections addressing research objectives, target populations, geographic distribution, demographic and socioeconomic profiles, skills, organizations, networks, interests, connections, and potential forms of engagement.
¹⁴  Rodríguez-Montemayor, E. (2012). Diaspora direct investment: Policy options for development (IDB Policy Brief No. IDB-PB-183). Inter-American Development Bank. https://doi.org/10.18235/0008424
¹⁵  Agunias, D. R., & Newland, K. (2012). Developing a road map for engaging diasporas in development: A handbook for policymakers and practitioners in home and host countries. International Organization for Migration and Migration Policy Institute.