The new dynamic is very different from the competing ideological-political-military blocks that characterized the Cold War and is arguably not the product of conscious design by the PRC or any single one of the actors empowered by engaging with it.
Trade, loans, and investment have been the instruments of choice for Chinese strategists in the region. But people-to-people ties are increasingly important as well. For this, Confucius Institutes (CIs) are a key strategic tool.
President Alberto Fernández’s state visit to Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) this month was tragic for Argentina—its national interests, its reputation as a democratic voice in the region, and moderates within Peronism who sincerely believe in the government as a tool for social justice and progress.
Political risk will increase in the region this year. We must prepare for another year of cloudy times.
Russia’s posture in Latin America is far more threatening to the U.S. than that of China.
Last Monday, Daniel Ortega was sworn in for a fourth consecutive term as president of Nicaragua.
The future of the U.S.-Latin America relationship should not just be a story of Latin America waiting for what the U.S. will do towards the region; it is increasingly important to know what Latin American countries can bring to the table.
In 2022, the United States will find that after a few initial signs of hope, the hemisphere to which it is intimately bound by ties of geography, commerce, and family is more dangerous, less democratic, less stable, less willing to cooperate, and more engaged than ever with its extra-regional rivals.
Colombia must leverage both international markets and geopolitics to complete its ambitious railway plan.
The United States no longer has the luxury to scold its partners in the region. Washington has never faced a hemisphere so politically disposed to resist U.S. pressure, or so fully enabled by an adversary’s money to do so.
