The Americas’ Last Election of 2024: What Lies Ahead for Uruguay?

While the country's democratic institutions and rule of law remain robust and resilient, it would be misleading to believe that Uruguay is immune to the political instability and polarization rampant throughout the region.

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Image Source: Dante Fernandez/AFP.

On November 24, closing this year’s hectic electoral cycle in the Western Hemisphere, Uruguayans will go to the polls one more time. The run-off election will define who will govern the country for the next five years. Voters will choose between Yamandú Orsi, of the center-left Frente Amplio and Álvaro Delgado, of the center-right Partido Nacional. While the country’s democratic institutions and rule of law remain robust and resilient, it would be misleading to believe that Uruguay is immune to the political instability and polarization rampant throughout the region.

This year’s elections in the region has demonstrated that when the political establishment fails to address fundamental issues or struggles to communicate effectively, frustrated voters turn to disruptive political outsiders. While this is not new in Latin America, Uruguay should pay close attention. Uruguayans should not be forced into the false choice between preserving democratic institutions and the rule of law and addressing critical issues like crime reduction, as seen in other parts of the region. While the temptation of quick solutions is strong, history has demonstrated that populist shortcuts ultimately bring more long-term costs than benefits.

On October 27, an overwhelming majority of Uruguayans signaled that they are not ready to support populist adventures that could undermine the country’s rule of law or fiscal stability. Both the rejection of the social security plebiscite and the proposed modification of the constitution to allow nighttime police raids sent a clear message in this direction. Indeed, nearly 60 percent of the Uruguayan electorate voted against the attractive but fiscally irresponsible offer of lowering the retirement age from 65 back to 60 and linking pensions to the national minimum wage. Likewise, while insecurity is the main concern for Uruguayans, a similar proportion of the electorate refused to trade their constitutional rights for the presumed security improvement of nighttime police raids.

So, why should Uruguay pay attention to what is happening in the region despite this?

Nearly 40 years after Uruguay’s re-democratization process, the country’s political system is amid a historic generational shift. Indeed, this electoral cycle marked the first since 1985 in which none of the political heavyweights (from both left and right) of the last four decades ran for the presidency, senate or even congress. While some of them have already passed away, including former presidents Jorge Batlle and Tabaré Vázquez, as well as Frente Amplio’s leading economist Danilo Astori, others are advanced in age, such as former presidents José Mujica, Julio María Sanguinetti, and Luis Alberto Lacalle, and have made the choice to step aside for younger colleagues.

Although to varying degrees, these politicians had a common trait: while in office, they were able to build consensus across different political factions, moderating political extremes, and prioritizing the political center. Indeed, Uruguay’s model, characterized by strong democratic institutions, the rule of law, and a free market economy with robust safety nets that prevent high inequality, is largely shaped by the political decisions of these leaders. Although generational changes are natural and desirable, these transitions generate instability, as in the turbulent 1960s. Apart from President Luis Lacalle Pou, it remains unclear who, if anyone, will be the “political heavyweights” of Uruguay’s future.

Moreover, Uruguay is likely entering into a new formally bipartisan age. The October 27 election results rang warning bells in the center-right governing coalition. While the center-right coalition parties all-together obtained 47 percent of the vote and the center-left Frente Amplio 44 percent, the coalition lost the majority in lower and upper chambers and Frente Amplio regained a majority in the senate. Indeed, the country’s electoral system favors the largest political party, and the center-right coalition misses clear political opportunities due to its fragmentation. It is expected that in the next five years there will be intense negotiations to create a new political party that will host the historical rivals Partido Nacional and Partido Colorado – two of the oldest political parties in the world – among others. How it will play out, however, remains to be seen.

In this context, the next administration, without a majority in congress, will have to address some key social problems that neither the center-left nor center-right, due to different circumstances, were able to tackle before. Insecurity and the cost of living will likely remain a top priority for the next administration. Today, insecurity in Uruguay is fueled by the inroads made by organized crime over the past few decades, which threaten both social cohesion and democratic institutions. Contributing factors include porous borders, a crumbling and overcrowded correctional system, and a failing education system. On the other hand, Uruguay’s cost of living is staggering. While the country has one of the highest per capita incomes in the region, it is also one of the most expensive countries in the world, surpassing even advanced economies like the United Kingdom and Germany. Uruguayans pay 80 percent more for basic goods than Mexicans and 20 percent more than their neighbors, Argentina and Brazil.

The unavoidable generational shift, the realignment of the political parties, and the presumed new age of formal bipartisanship, as well as the pressing social issues facing Uruguayans, represent a significant challenge for the country. How the system absorbs and responds to these challenges will very likely determine if Uruguay’s current model will survive or if Uruguay will be forced to build a new governing model for its future.

Alejandro Trenchi is a Political Science PhD candidate at the University of Florida. Formerly, he was Director of Research and Programs at Global Americans.

Global Americans takes pride in serving as a platform that offers in-depth analyses on various political, economic, environmental, and foreign affairs issues in the Western Hemisphere. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Global Americans or anyone associated with it, and publication by Global Americans does not constitute an endorsement of all or any part of the views expressed.

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