After successfully asserting control over Venezuela’s oil, Washington has turned to a new arena: shaping Venezuela’s foreign policy. This was evident in Venezuelan acting president Delcy Rodriguez’s five-day trip to India in early June. The announcement of the visit did not come from Caracas or New Delhi, but from Secretary of State Marco Rubio on May 22, a day before his own visit to India. During his visit, Rubio pushed for increased Venezuelan oil exports to India as a corollary of reduced Russian oil sales to India.
Washington did not micromanage Rodriguez’s visit, but it appeared to be guiding from the sidelines. This was apparent in her meeting with U.S. Ambassador to India Sergio Gor on the first day of the visit, in a day packed with meetings with India’s prime minister, foreign minister, and oil minister. It is unusual for a visiting head of government to hold a meeting with the Ambassador of a third country, but the meeting with Gor seems par for the course in the context of the hybrid, client-state relationship between the U.S. and Venezuela. New Delhi did not mind either, as it prioritizes its relationship with Washington far more than with Caracas.
From Washington’s perspective, India is a preferable partner for Venezuela than China. Closer India-Venezuela ties will only help improve the U.S.-Venezuela relationship. Much of the oil that flowed from Venezuela between 2020 and 2025 went to China, but now those exports are increasingly destined for India. If Washington ever wants to squeeze Caracas, it can reinstate oil sanctions on Venezuela, and India will promptly pause imports, much as it did in late 2020. Washington’s interests on Venezuela align well with Delhi’s, and both countries seem to be working in tandem to benefit their interests.
From a geopolitical perspective, this is a win-win situation for India, Venezuela, and the U.S. For India, rising oil prices have added pressure on government finances, increased inflation, weakened the rupee, and burdened consumers. It is a relief for India to have another source of oil. For Venezuela, India has been a highly dependable importer in the 21st century, given its ability to refine large amounts of extra heavy crude. Venezuela and India are merely picking up where they left off in 2019, before U.S. sanctions on Venezuelan oil came into effect. For Washington, the increase in Venezuelan exports to India has a dual use: it reaffirms the notion that the U.S. controls Venezuela’s oil by instructing which countries it will flow to, and it nudges India to reduce its dependence on Russian oil.
The increase in Venezuelan oil flows to India is not just a theoretical notion nor a diplomatic desire. It’s already a reality. So far in 2026, India is the largest recipient of Venezuelan oil after the U.S., receiving 26% of total exports. Although the recent increase in Venezuelan oil sales to India has been framed under the context of the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the ongoing war in Iran, it would be inaccurate to attribute this increase to India’s diversification of oil sources. The India-Venezuela oil trade is not new. It stretches back 26 years to late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, who traveled to India four times: on transit visits to Mumbai in 1999, 2000, and 2001, and on a state visit to Delhi, Kolkata and Bangalore in March 2005. The transit visits to Mumbai were arguably more important, as Chavez met with the erstwhile Reliance Petroleum, which later merged with Reliance Industries, India’s largest company. By May 2000, Reliance imported the first major consignment of Venezuelan crude to India. It was thus an Indian private company, not the government-owned public sector units, that began the India-Venezuela oil trade in earnest. Chavez’s insistence on diversifying oil exports to India paved the way for Indian investment in Venezuelan oil fields and long-term supply deals with companies like Reliance. Due to these partnerships, in the decade of 2011-2020, Venezuela accounted for about 10% of India’s total oil imports.
Rodriguez’s trip to India is therefore a continuation of Venezuela’s outreach to India, even if Washington seems to be pulling the strings. The complementarity of Venezuela holding the largest oil reserves in the world and India as the third-largest oil importer is too significant to ignore. Beyond that, there is no political or strategic convergence between India and Venezuela, so the relationship remains rooted in economic diplomacy. Consequently, the state of Venezuela’s democracy is also of no concern to Delhi. Whether the left or right is in power in Venezuela, or if Washington works behind the scenes, India will always remain ready to buy copious amounts of heavy Venezuelan crude.
Hari Seshasayee is cofounder of Consilium Group and a visiting fellow at ORF.
