The People’s Republic of China (PRC) arguably regards the Caribbean as strategic, in the context of its broader engagement in the Western Hemisphere and globally
The People’s Republic of China engagement in the Caribbean is broad-based, including an array of investments and commercial projects, political engagement, people-to-people interaction, and security engagement.
The military leaders gathered in Tucson made important advances in working effectively together within the framework of the resources and policies established by our elected civilian leaders.
Few expect that sending a new international “reaction force” to Haiti will solve the country’s problems more than the United States and international efforts in the past—yet none can afford to do nothing—for good conscience or political expediency.
The overlapping political agendas of the Biden and incoming Lula administration and the diplomatic skill of the State Department team create a unique opportunity for the U.S.-Brazilian relationship to be positive.
The U.S. approach outlined in this article offers no guarantee of success. In its implementation, the notion of “outcompeting China” must be adequately conceptualized, coordinated, resourced, and intelligently applied.
Beyond Uruguay’s frustrations with Mercosur, the Chinese market has become increasingly critical for the country and its importance is growing.
The region’s political shift is making it increasingly difficult for the U.S. to secure collaboration on core security and foreign policy issues.
AMLO’s increasing need for the PRC and its resources is already manifesting itself in subtle compromises that his administration has made towards Chinese companies with respect to lithium, and possibly electricity generation, among other areas.
Despite some of AMLO’s actions effectively limit security cooperation with the U.S., such as the 2020 National Security Law, the U.S.-Mexico security relationship remains strong at the institutional level.
