Image Source: Brookings.
On February 14, a historic agreement was reached between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Cuba to establish ambassador-level diplomatic relations. This move is particularly significant as Cuba was the last nation in Latin America and the Caribbean without formal ties to South Korea, maintaining instead a relationship with North Korea. While the focus has largely been on its implications for North Korea, the broader impact on South Korea’s strategic position in the Latin American region warrants attention. Last month, following the establishment of new diplomatic ties, the 2024 Korea-Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) Future Cooperation Forum was held in Seoul, drawing over 200 participants involving ministers, ambassadors, industry officials, and experts from prominent countries in the region, including Cuba. Such developments can introduce fresh dynamics for U.S. foreign policy in the region, offering opportunities for a new approach to countering increasing Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere.
U.S. vs. China in Latin America
China’s growing influence in Latin America began to noticeably increase in the early 2000s after rapid economic expansion as well as the strategic pursuit of resources and markets to sustain this growth. Since then, the U.S. and China have been the two leading players in the battle for influence in Latin America, and the region has emerged as the new chessboard of in their great power competition.
China, with its massive economic power, has pushed into Latin America through trade and investment. Its engagement, though economically beneficial for the region, often comes with strings attached, promoting a governance model that favors centralized control and reduced transparency. This model, exemplified by initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has helped China embed itself deeply into the political and economic fabric of Latin American countries. Experts refer to these investments as “Corrosive Capital,” noting that they lack transparency and accountability, and that this type of capital exploits governance gaps to influence economic, political, and social developments in recipient countries. As demonstrated by the Coca Codo Sinclair dam project in Ecuador, China has bolstered governments that help further its geopolitical and economic interests, albeit at the cost of promoting democratic principles and sometimes the interests of recipient countries. The shift in diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China by several Central American countries over the past decade has underscored growing Latin American ties to China.
On the other hand, the United States has historically been the most influential outside power in the region, promoting democracy and economic partnerships. However, the need for the U.S. to reaffirm its influence has grown in recent years to counterbalance China’s expanding footprint in the region. Programs such as the Biden administration’s Build Back Better World initiative, designed to enhance infrastructure development and offer a value-drive and accountable alternative to China’s BRI, are a good foundation to build deeper U.S.-Latin American relations upon.
Despite these nascent efforts, the U.S. still faces a significant challenge. The declining net favorability of the U.S. compared to China in the region is telling. Although the U.S. still holds greater favorability over China, the margin is closing. Additionally, there is a historical distrust towards the U.S., stemming from its long history of unilateral interventions in the region. China has capitalized on this distrust by promoting anti-American narratives and bolstering pro-China sovereigntist leaders in the region.
South Korea Comes In
Considering all these factors, the strengthening of South Korean influence in Latin America presents a strategic opportunity for the United States. The development of South Korea’s economic and diplomatic ties with the region aligns with U.S. interests in promoting democratic norms and sustainable development against Chinese practices of corrosive capital and democratic backsliding in the region.
Indeed, South Korea is a prime candidate for such a role. In 2018, South Korea’s trade with Latin America exceeded USD 50 billion, becoming the second largest Asian trade partner to the region after China. South Korean companies, particularly in the automotive and electronics sectors, have already established substantial operations in Latin America and made significant investments into regional infrastructure, integrating the region into global supply chains while strengthening U.S.-led nearshoring efforts.
Moreover, South Korea’s proactive engagement in the region is likely to continue as cooperation becomes increasingly institutionalized. Seoul has signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with several Central American countries and is negotiating with the Mercosur bloc. Additionally, South Korea has contributed USD 200 million in grants through the Inter-American Development Bank, supporting projects in anti-poverty programs, small businesses, and technological innovation. Such “constructive capital” is characterized by its adherence to market principles, transparency, and accountability, contrasting sharply with China’s corrosive capital.
Without carrying the suspicious motivations often attributed to great powers, South Korea can easily engage with developing countries in Latin America, positioning itself as a key partner in areas such as digital innovations and climate response. Cultural exchange and joint research initiatives have strengthened people-to-people ties and enhanced South Korea’s image as a reliable partner. Indeed, the Korea-Latin America and the Caribbean Future Cooperation Forum, mentioned above, exemplified South Korea’s commitment to deepening these relationships. Officials from Cuba, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Guatemala, among others, participated in the forum, highlighting the growing interest among Latin American leaders across the political spectrum in the expanding cooperation.
Above all, South Korea stands out as an ideal partner because of the Yoon administration’s goal to establish South Korea as a “Global Pivotal State.” This vision entails playing a significant role on the global stage, promoting democracy through value-based diplomacy. According to the Brookings Institution, this concept is built on three key themes: deeper values, greater strategic relevance, and increased global public goods. These principles, which underly South Korea’s current foreign policy, align perfectly with U.S. interests in fostering democratic values in Latin America, countering China’s influence, and preventing corruption and authoritarianism in the region.
From the U.S. perspective, South Korea’s influence in Latin America can promote broader strategic objectives without the United States’ historical baggage. South Korea’s relatively neutral stance and similar value-based diplomatic approach make it an ideal intermediary. The U.S. can leverage this perceived neutrality to promote South Korea as a key partner in diplomatic and economic initiatives, benefitting both nations in the region at the expense of China. Together, the U.S. and South Korea can forge a dynamic foreign policy partnership and a market-oriented, democratic Western Hemisphere.
Chan Mo Ku is a former military officer at the Strategic Planning Directorate of the Republic of Korea – United States Combined Forces Command. Chan Mo received his M.A. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and B.A. from King’s College London. His works were published in publications including The Diplomat, iAffairs Canada, and the Breaking Defense.
