Image Source: VOA.
When visiting many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, it is hard not to notice the growing presence of Chinese technology—whether it is the growing number of Chinese electric vehicles on the roads or the billboards for Chinese telecommunications firms. Even in El Salvador, a country with relatively close relations with the United States, this is evident—with a Chinese flag flying next to El Salvador’s in front of the new technologically advanced national library. This is not a coincidence, but highlights China’s efforts to leverage science and technology in its relationships with Latin America and the Caribbean.
While the United States has its own science diplomacy initiatives, China’s ability to more effectively articulate their efforts and tie science diplomacy to their broader diplomatic objectives has made it appear as though they far outpace U.S. efforts. While some of this is due to the nature of the U.S. economy relative to China’s ability to lean on massive state-owned enterprises, it also reflects Washington’s relative neglect of the region and challenges in communicating U.S. engagement with the region.
Chinese Science Diplomacy
Chinese science diplomacy in the Americas has been multifaceted and is effectively leveraged as part of its broader geopolitical objectives. Indeed, China has embedded science diplomacy within its regional outreach through key subforums within the China-CELAC Forum and included some Latin American countries in its Digital Silk Road. Science diplomacy is also critical as China seeks to shift its economic model toward the “new three” exports of electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and solar cells. While China’s science diplomacy is broad and touches on many sectors, there are four in particular where this engagement has been particularly prevalent—space, health, the Green Energy Transition, and telecommunication infrastructure.
Chinese science diplomacy in these domains is not only about the material benefits these investments can have for China, but is also used to pursue other objectives and to frame China’s broader relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean. As with other elements of China’s foreign policy, China regularly frames its science diplomacy as a win-win agreement and part of broader South-South cooperation. Given the needs of many countries in Latin America to close the digital divide as well as pursue 21st century development solutions, this message resonates.
This messaging has been quite effective for China, but there have been notable cases of positive messaging outpacing Chinese actions. For instance, while the United States provided more COVID-19 vaccines—not to mention more effective—to many countries in the region, perceptions that China had been more helpful to the regional response to the pandemic persist. Additionally, there were cases of China leveraging vaccine to attain other geopolitical ends. For instance, a recent report highlighted Chinese efforts to encourage the Brazilian government’s adoption of Huawei’s 5G infrastructure in exchange for vaccine access—an action that ultimately worked. Conversely, Chinese efforts to shift Paraguay’s recognition of Taiwan through vaccine diplomacy backfired.
Addressing Growing Chinese Influence
U.S. policymakers are increasingly concerned about Chinese engagement in the Americas, with members of Congress and U.S. Southern Command highlighting Chinese influence as one of the greatest challenges in the Americas. Given the effectiveness of Chinese science diplomacy, the United States needs to lean into areas where it can most effectively compete with Chinese influence and develop a more coherent science messaging of its own.
In trying to compete with China, the United States needs to consider which areas it can have the greatest impact. U.S. efforts to compete with Chinese 5G have faltered due to the lack of a realistic and competitive alternative. Likewise, U.S. auto producers have noted that they cannot compete with the low cost of Chinese electric vehicles. However, U.S. efforts to limit Chinese engagement have been limited by both current trade policy and over-reliance on national security appeals rather than focusing on how and where the U.S. can compete.
Recently, U.S. policymakers have taken important steps that could provide a backbone for strengthening U.S. science diplomacy efforts. The U.S. military has long been an important actor in promoting science diplomacy in the Americas and continues to do so. For example, U.S. Southern Command is actively engaging in science diplomacy through its operations and recently hosted regional leaders for a conversation on space cooperation. At the same time, the Biden Administration’s Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP) has embraced tech and science as an important component, supporting the development of a Costa Rica as a tech hub and collaborating with Chile to develop a space partnership program known as APEP-S. Similarly, the bipartisan Americas Trade and Investment Act, introduced earlier this year, incorporates important incentives to boost science cooperation and investment in the region.
However, over-reliance on the military and APEP as the tools for science diplomacy runs its own risks. For example, while APEP is an important tool for promoting cooperation, it only includes 12 members out of the 35 sovereign states in the Americas—hindering its ability at fostering regional cooperation and limiting its ability to serve as a counterweight to China in the other countries in the region. Likewise, while the U.S. military can be an important tool for promoting science diplomacy, more can be done to encourage deeper private sector engagement in promoting science partnerships and cooperation.
In addition to expanding its own science diplomacy efforts, the United States needs to rethink its communications strategy surrounding technology in the region. However, this should be done carefully. While it is important for the United States to highlight areas where China has overstepped or where there are issues in China’s approach, it is not enough to just talk about China. Instead, the best way to counter Chinese influence operations in the Americas is to highlight positive examples of U.S. engagement. By focusing on how the United States can be a valuable partner, U.S. messaging can help develop positive perceptions of the United States rather than coming across as scolding Latin American and Caribbean countries for engaging with China—particularly as they often view it as in their own interest to do so.
Trying to stop Chinese science diplomacy without offering an alternative will not work. Similarly, trying to stop Chinese science and technology engagement with sanctions will backfire. If the United States is serious about being Latin America and the Caribbean’s preferred partner, it needs to deepen its own engagement and communication strategy. As China has shown, science diplomacy can be an important area for the United States to partner with the Americas.
Funding for this article and its accompanying report was provided by the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy at Florida International University. For more on Chinese Science Diplomacy in the Americas, please read the full report here.
Adam Ratzlaff is a specialist and consultant in Inter-American affairs as well as a member of Diplomatic Courier’s World in 2050 Brain Trust. He has previously worked with the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Global Americans, among other groups.
