Image Source: Reuters.
How has the Mexican political and economic landscape changed since AMLO took office six years ago, and how does this help or hinder the new Sheinbaum government?
Since taking office in 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) has reshaped Mexico’s political landscape by consolidating power around the presidency and establishing Morena as a dominant force across federal and state governments. With Morena winning key governorships and legislative seats, AMLO maintained significant control over policy direction with minimal opposition. His administration marginalized several independent institutions, including the judiciary and the National Electoral Institute (INE), raising concerns about democratic backsliding. AMLO’s direct communication strategy, through plebiscites and daily “mañanera” press conferences, allowed him to connect with the public and reinforce his popularity, despite criticisms of his security and economic policies.
Economically, AMLO’s administration focused on a type of fiscal conservatism, avoiding debt accumulation while reallocating expenditures toward ambitious social programs. Through increased pensions and minimum wage hikes, he aimed to reduce poverty and boost labor’s share of income, albeit at the cost of sluggish economic growth. Mexico’s GDP growth under AMLO was the weakest in four decades, and average real per capita income declined. AMLO’s commitment to strengthening state-owned enterprises, particularly Pemex and the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), discouraged private sector investment in key sectors like energy, creating uncertainty and restricting economic dynamism.
In his final year, AMLO’s fiscal policy grew more expansionary, resulting in Mexico’s largest fiscal deficit in over 30 years. The COVID-19 pandemic’s economic toll and costly infrastructure projects, such as the Dos Bocas refinery and Tren Maya, further strained public finances. This shift has left AMLO’s successor, Claudia Sheinbaum, with a significantly constrained fiscal environment and a budget deficit projected to be nearly 6 percent of GDP. Additionally, declining oil production and Pemex’s debt burden add further complications to Mexico’s economic outlook, making it essential for Sheinbaum to address these issues carefully.
Sheinbaum inherits a political landscape with Morena holding substantial power, which may ease her path in passing legislation. Her strong mandate, supported by a 60 percent electoral win, positions her to continue AMLO’s agenda, though it comes with high public expectations. While she will likely seek to maintain the “Fourth Transformation” (AMLO’s populist restructuring of the state and purported attempt to address widespread corruption), she faces the challenge of addressing institutional weaknesses and responding to critics regarding democratic integrity, especially concerning judicial reforms and electoral oversight.
While AMLO’s legacy of centralized power and ambitious social spending provides Sheinbaum with a strong political foundation, her maneuverability is limited by fiscal constraints and a need to foster economic growth. Tax reforms could become necessary to support Mexico’s social programs and infrastructure initiatives sustainably, given the limited fiscal space left by AMLO. Private sector investment, particularly in energy and infrastructure, could help offset fiscal constraints and stimulate longer-term growth. Striking a balance between continuity and reform will be crucial for Sheinbaum as she seeks to maintain stability while addressing Mexico’s pressing economic and institutional challenges.
How will Sheinbaum approach relations with the U.S. on delicate issues, like immigration, water access, or weapons sales? How would her approach differ based on the outcome of the U.S. election?
Claudia Sheinbaum’s approach to U.S. relations on sensitive issues like immigration, water access, and weapons sales is expected to be more pragmatic and methodical than that of her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). Her scientific background and her experience as mayor of Mexico City suggest she will prioritize collaboration and problem-solving, especially with the U.S., given the two countries’ close ties in trade, security, and migration. Unlike AMLO’s often confrontational style, Sheinbaum may foster a more stable bilateral relationship, aiming to find practical solutions in areas of mutual interest.
On immigration, Sheinbaum is likely to continue some of AMLO’s enforcement strategies, given the high migrant flows into Mexico and the U.S. policy on asylum processing in Mexico. However, she may introduce a more humanitarian approach, focusing on improving the treatment of migrants and seeking increased U.S. support for development initiatives in southern Mexico and Central America. This shift could help address the root causes of migration, balancing enforcement with efforts to reduce migrant flows more sustainably.
The U.S. presidential election outcome will heavily influence Sheinbaum’s flexibility in immigration policy. If Donald Trump returns to office, his administration would likely impose stricter demands on Mexico to curb migration, potentially pressuring Mexico to militarize its borders further. This could lead to strained relations, as Sheinbaum may have limited room to negotiate and might face the possibility of economic penalties or tariffs if she does not comply with more aggressive U.S. immigration measures. Under Trump, the focus could shift to enforcement over cooperation, challenging Sheinbaum’s ability to balance U.S. expectations with Mexico’s resources and priorities.
Specifically, Trump has consistently promised to “launch the largest deportation program in American history” should he win a second term. The deportation plan is the center of his platform, and one on which he has offered many details, including his willingness to use the military, his intention to deport 15 to 20 million immigrants, and the foundation of Eisenhower-era “Operation Wetback” (which deported citizens as well as undocumented immigrants through the use of a wide dragnet approach) as a model for the plan. Aside from its massive ramifications for the U.S. and its economy, such a plan would disproportionately burden Latin American countries struggling with high numbers of migrants like Mexico, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic with administrative challenges none have the resources to address. Such an expulsion of migrants across the Americas would likely lead to a surge in poverty, crime, and growth of the region’s transnational gangs, ultimately incentivizing even more migration in the long term.
In contrast, a Kamala Harris presidency would likely result in a more cooperative approach, with similar policies to the current Biden administration and more ideological similarity to Sheinbaum. Harris’s policies would probably focus on managing migration collaboratively and investing in development aid to address migration’s root causes. This outcome would allow Sheinbaum greater flexibility to negotiate comprehensive solutions that benefit both nations. With Harris, U.S.-Mexico relations would likely emphasize shared goals, creating opportunities for Sheinbaum to secure investment in development programs and collaborate on other issues with less emphasis on strict enforcement.
Water access and weapons sales are additional areas where Sheinbaum’s collaborative approach could be beneficial. For water management, she may focus on sustainable resource-sharing agreements, using her scientific expertise to advocate for joint infrastructure projects and U.S. technical support to address water scarcity in border areas. On weapons trafficking, Sheinbaum is likely to prioritize stronger cooperation with the U.S. to curb illegal arms flow into Mexico, which contributes significantly to cartel violence. While AMLO struck an adversarial tone in addressing weapons trafficking, including by launching an unlikely legal challenge against U.S. gun manufacturers, Sheinbaum’s past experience working with U.S. law enforcement could facilitate closer collaboration to address this challenge effectively.
Sheinbaum’s approach to U.S. relations will likely be characterized by collaboration and pragmatism, but the degree of flexibility she has will largely depend on the outcome of the U.S. election. While a Harris administration could open doors for mutual investment and sustainable policies, a Trump presidency might push Mexico into a more defensive stance on immigration and trade. Sheinbaum’s challenge will be to navigate these dynamics effectively, balancing U.S. demands with Mexico’s needs and her own administration’s goals.
How will the Mexican security and justice systems shift under Sheinbaum? Will she address the failures of AMLO’s “hugs, not bullets” anti-crime strategy or uphold the status quo?
Former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) earned the dubious distinction of overseeing more murders in his first five years than any other president in Mexican history. Many believe the blame here lies in his hands-off “hugs, not bullets” approach to cartel violence, which ended decades of militarized Mexican intervention in cartel warfare in favor of tackling presumptive root causes of violence like poverty and unemployment. Despite his professed departure from traditional Mexican counter-narcotics policy, AMLO’s administration also gradually militarized its response to cartels, even going so far as to move the hugely important National Guard to military rather than civilian control at the end of his term.
In contrast with AMLO and the disappointing results of his attempt to tackle Mexican crime, his protege and now president Claudia Sheinbaum was widely lauded for her deterrence-focused security strategy as mayor of Mexico City, credited with halving the city’s homicide rate. And yet, despite hopes she may bring a similarly successful approach to her term as president, she has so far refrained from criticizing the prior administration’s approach, leaving her in a somewhat confused middle position. So what is her approach likely to bring?
On October 8, Sheinbaum unveiled her new strategy, a four-pronged approach which appears to be a balancing act between her predecessor’s preferred policies and her own. Pillars 1 and 2 of the new security policy are addressing root causes and militarizing the national guard, direct inheritances from AMLO. But in Pillars 3 and 4, strengthening intelligence capabilities and increasing law enforcement coordination, we can begin to see some of Sheinbaum’s own preferences manifest themselves. All this is complemented by the appointment of Omar Garcia Harfuch, her former security chief as Mexico City mayor, as Mexico’s new security minister.
Much of her success in fighting crime as mayor came from deterrence and government “violence interruption” made possible by increasing boots on the ground, building sophisticated intelligence gathering and sharing programs, and collaborating with U.S. regional law enforcement. Announced plans to double the number of federal investigators and expand the National Guard offer promising signals that the country may see a repeat of her successful approach. However, inter-cartel crime is likely to continue to play a major role in Mexican security so long as cartel leadership feels immune to prosecution, something Mexico’s recent judicial reform has done little to remedy.
Ultimately, however, the largest question for Mexico’s security will likely be whether Sheinbaum is more willing than her predecessor to collaborate with the U.S., and whether she will find a willing partner in the White House. AMLO ended decadeslong law enforcement and investigation programs between the two countries, largely due to a distrust of U.S. involvement in what he deemed “internal affairs” rather than concerns over the programs’ efficacy. The government’s hostile reaction to U.S. capture of a Sinaloa cartel boss and drug sentencing of corrupt former Mexican security officials has done nothing to improve Washington’s view of the country’s political elite as unwilling to address the issue. Of course, the results of the U.S. election are also likely to play a role, with Harris seen as much more likely to foster a positive relationship with Sheinbaum than Trump, should he win a second term. Yet, while we may not know concretely how the Mexican security situation will shift until a new president takes office in the White House, Mexico itself looks to be in safer hands as Sheinbaum avoids a repeat of her predecessor’s bloody sexenio.
How will Sheinbaum change AMLO’s energy policy? Will she sustain her predecessor’s emphasis on fossil fuels and Pemex, or is a shift towards renewables and green infrastructure in Mexico’s future?
Claudia Sheinbaum’s presidency marks a potential shift in Mexico’s energy policy as she balances her predecessor AMLO’s emphasis on state-led fossil fuel initiatives with a commitment to renewable energy. Under AMLO, energy policy focused on energy sovereignty and centralized control through state-owned entities like Pemex and the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), prioritizing fossil fuels while sidelining private sector investment in renewables. Sheinbaum, however, brings a scientific background in environmental engineering and a track record of promoting green infrastructure during her tenure as Mexico City mayor. Her initial plans include a $40 billion investment to boost Mexico’s renewable energy share to 45 percent by 2030, signaling an important step towards a low-carbon energy transition.
Sheinbaum’s renewable energy strategy is likely to focus on public-private partnerships, such as Build, Lease, and Transfer (BLT) contracts, which would enable private firms to develop projects while preserving CFE’s role in energy production. This approach could create a pathway for private investment, making renewable projects financially viable while reinforcing state oversight. Sheinbaum’s ability to attract private investors and reassure them of stable, supportive policies will be crucial, particularly given AMLO’s legacy of regulatory uncertainty, which previously hindered foreign investment in Mexico’s clean energy sector.
At the same time, Sheinbaum faces significant political and legislative challenges in shifting Mexico’s energy landscape. AMLO’s ongoing influence within Morena and his preference for state control may limit her flexibility, especially if legislative reforms needed to facilitate renewable projects are met with resistance. Already, the legislature has amended the constitution to take more control over Pemex and CFE, a long-time AMLO goal that may threaten their ability to compete with the private sector. Additionally, her administration must address external pressures, particularly from the United States, as the upcoming 2026 USMCA review will require Mexico to demonstrate commitment to fair energy practices and environmental goals. By clarifying Mexico’s renewable objectives and ensuring a level playing field for U.S. and other foreign investors, Sheinbaum could strengthen Mexico’s trade relationships while advancing her green agenda.
Despite these hurdles, Sheinbaum’s commitment to sustainable energy is intertwined with a broader goal of social and environmental justice. Her emphasis on expanding clean energy access to underserved areas and addressing climate-related issues such as water scarcity reflects her intent to align environmental priorities with equitable development. Sheinbaum’s vision for renewable energy thus not only supports climate action but also fosters social inclusion and economic resilience, potentially positioning Mexico as a leader in Latin America’s energy transition.
Scott Brasesco is Senior Director at Global Americans, where he leads programs on U.S. Latin America Policy and Identity and Vulnerable Communities.
Juan Diego Solis de Ovando is a Program Associate at Global Americans.
