Image Source: AMLO/Twitter.
In November 2024, Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum confirmed that her country was sending oil shipments to Cuba as well as offering technical support for the Caribbean country’s burned-out public utilities. She stated: “We are going to support Cuba. Even if they criticize it, we are going to show solidarity.”. But is propping up the dictatorial Cuban regime a smart move for Sheinbaum considering a second Trump administration will be in office in 2025 and has already signaled that Mexico is likely to be a major policy piñata over everything from the border and migration issues to drug cartel violence, fentanyl, and China’s role in its economy?
Mexico’s sizeable exports of oil to Cuba are deeply appreciated by the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), which presides over an acute energy crisis, an economy in freefall, a struggling healthcare system, and massive outbound migration. While the lights were going out in Cuba, Mexico sent close to a million barrels of crude and diesel, which complements at least $300 million in fuel sent by the North American country to the Caribbean one since the beginning of 2023. According to Jorge Pinon, senior research fellow at the University of Texas at Austin’s Energy Center, “Mexico is now key because Venezuela has dropped its supplies to Cuba, Russian oil it’s nowhere to be seen. And so today, Mexico’s oil deliveries to Cuba are extremely important.”
Mexico’s relationship with Cuba has deep roots. Both countries share Spanish colonialism, revolutions, and having to deal with an often interventionist U.S. Moreover, it was from Mexico that Fidel Castro launched the Granma, which sailed to Cuba in 1956, kicking off the revolution which would bring him to power in 1959. Mexico has long demonstrated support for Cuba, repeatedly voting against the U.S. economic embargo of Cuba. Indeed, in October 2023, Mexico’s then president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), stated that “U.S. policy vis-á-vis Cuba and its ‘blockade’ is completely worn out, anachronistic, it has no future or point, and it no longer benefits anyone.”
During the AMLO years (2018-2024), Mexico deepened its relations with Cuba. The motivations for this were both personal and ideological. AMLO is a left-wing populist, who regards neoliberal economics (as advanced by the United States and the West) as evil and favors a strongly nationalistic and statist approach as well as being an ardent admirer of Castro. In February 2023, he stated that Castro was “a visionary, a giant to whom we pay tribute. Conservatives in Mexico and around the world can say whatever they want, but they will never, ever be able to counteract the teaching, the example of solidarity, of brotherhood that the revolutionary movement and its leaders have left Cuba.”
But there is more to it than simple admiration for Castro. AMLO perceived himself as an important Global South leader, exhibiting solidarity with developing economies. Consequently, Cuba, fighting against the “Colossus of the North”, played to the Mexican leader’s desire to be seen as an independent international actor not under the shadow of U.S. policy. This was evident in February 2023 when Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel made an official visit to Mexico to barter for oil and other goods for Cuban medical personnel. The warmth between Havana and Mexico City was further underscored by Mexico’s decision to rejoin the G77 at the September 2023 Cuban summit. By extending his hand to Cuba, the Mexican leader stuck to his core foreign policy guideposts of popular sovereignty, equality of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, and a rejection of foreign intervention justified as civilizing missions.
AMLO’s ideological leanings gave him a soft spot for leftist Latin American and Caribbean autocrats like Castro and Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro. Indeed, Venezuela’s president, who the U.S. government has accused of supervising a narcotics cartel and holds responsible for over 8 million refugees, was feted in Mexico in September 2021. Both Díaz-Canel and Maduro were invited to Sheinbaum’s inauguration in 2024, with the Cuban leader attending. Mexico’s approach to Venezuela’s fraudulent July 2024 elections, in which he refused to condemn Maduro, was also notable.
AMLO’s closer embrace of Cuba was not without opposition. AMLO was largely silent on human rights abuses in Cuba and the Cuban doctor program stirred up considerable opposition. Beyond the perception that Cuban medical staff are treated as indentured laborers for the benefit of the Cuban government, objections were raised over the bad message it sent to Mexico’s doctors, many of which were looking for work, and how the policy ran contrary “to provide employment to the people of Mexico.”
And for all his bluster about Cuba, AMLO was a relatively astute political actor. He was keenly aware of the importance of maintaining good relations with Washington, especially during the first Trump administration. This was reflected by his willingness to renegotiate NAFTA, turning it into the USMCA. This pragmatism was also extended to the borders and migrants. When the U.S. changed administrations AMLO softened his country’s approach to dealing with drug cartels and was quite willing to loosen border controls with the view that President Biden had a far looser touch on the border. Adding to the complexity of his views, he was also cautious about China’s new role in Latin America and the Caribbean, which was evident in his nationalization of his country’s lithium sector, which negatively impacted China’s Ganfeng Mining.
Sheinbaum has inherited a political environment that remains strongly influenced by AMLO. It was under her administration that the most recent oil shipments were made. The question is how much more does Mexico want to extend to Cuba? There are obvious constraints in the relationship, something that the Sheinbaum administration is no doubt aware. Probably the most significant is that while Mexico has what Cuba needs, Cuba has little of what Mexico needs. This shows up in the trade data: according to the IMF’s Direction Trade (DOTS) (11/25/2024), Mexico is sixth in terms of the destination of Cuba’s imports ($335.70 million), well behind Venezuela ($1.5 billion), Spain ($888 million), China ($545 million), the U.S. ($381 million), and Brazil ($377 million). Cuban exports are painfully small with Mexico sitting in 12th place at $25 million. Cuba’s big three export markets (Canada, Venezuela and China) combined are over $1.3 billion. It is difficult to see where Mexico can gain on this trade. Is it worth risking the U.S. goods and services trade between the U.S. and Mexico which totaled $855 billion in 2022? The latter trade relationship currently runs in Mexico’s favor to the tune of a $131 billion surplus in 2022.
Mexico under AMLO gave Cuba a warm embrace, but with limited dividends and the risk of appearing to support Latin America’s longest living dictatorship. Coming to power in 2024, Sheinbaum has inherited a policy which now has much more potential downside risk. Can she maintain AMLO’s love for Cuba and somehow thread a path through the incoming Trump administration’s tougher policies that will probably include a tightening of the economic noose around the PCC regime? Mexican support for Cuba will not alone dictate U.S. policy, but it will certainly not help it. While AMLO was able to get away with little consequence in his support of Cuba, Sheinbaum’s Mexico could pay for it. With Trump’s announcement that he will impose a 25 percent tariff on all Mexican goods, the tone is already being set.
Scott B. MacDonald is Chief Economist at Smith’s Research & Gradings, Senior Fellow at Global Americans, and Founding Member of the Caribbean Policy Consortium.
Global Americans takes pride in serving as a platform that offers in-depth analyses on various political, economic, environmental, and foreign affairs issues in the Western Hemisphere. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Global Americans or anyone associated with it, and publication by Global Americans does not constitute an endorsement of all or any part of the views expressed.
