No, Mexico Is Not Returning To Its Authoritarian Past

With the Morena party capture and dismantling of Mexico’s institutional structure, it is often declared that the country has reverted to the one-party system that dominated its politics for most of the 20th century. Yet, this interpretation is both a misreading of history and an inaccurate analogy.

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When the Gods wish to punish us, they answer our prayers ― Oscar Wilde

With the Morena party capture and dismantling of Mexico’s institutional structure, it is often declared that the country has reverted to the one-party system that dominated its politics for most of the 20th century. Yet, this interpretation is both a misreading of history and an inaccurate analogy. The ongoing constitutional overhaul and the destruction of the rule of law has inaugurated an entirely new phenomenon with characteristics that are not only different but, on many accounts, opposite to the erstwhile authoritarian regime.

Yes, the mistaken analogy grew out of a similarity. There was in the past, as there is now, a concentration of power, but this is not the only trait of Mexico’s new political trajectory. If there are similarities, these are not as important as the differences: Morena’s origins are diverse, its project distinct, and its consequences will undoubtedly diverge. The differences described hereunder are not intended as a vindication or apology of a regime that was, for decades, undemocratic and fraught with flaws. Instead, this description is intended to demonstrate a contrast and unveil the inadequacy of using Mexico’s one-party past to understand its present.

The first hint for the distinction is found in the political career of former president and founder of Morena, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador: he abandoned the former ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) because his political project and personal attitudes were irreconcilable with those of the party. Lopez Obrador’s political proclivities have always incorporated an extreme form of deinstitutionalization, a posture unwanted in traditional Mexican political parties that, despite their ideological differences, were willing to play within the country’s existing institutional design and rules. The PRI defined itself by building institutions, for example, the Mexican Social Security Institute (the largest social security institution in Latin America), a public education system, an autonomous Central Bank, and the National Commission of Human Rights, among many others. Morena’s purpose is the opposite. Even with the ongoing capture of the judicial branch, it has been forgotten that it was under the PRI that an autonomous Supreme Court was created. The PRI promoted the creation of civil and professional bureaucracies, while Morena destroyed the careers of thousands of public servants and the technical expertise accumulated over decades.

Second, the PRI created some of Latin America’s best and most important public universities and institutions, such as the UNAM, the National Polytechnic Institute, the Conacyt, and the Fund for Economic Culture. On the contrary, Morena distinguishes itself by a clear disdain for education, science, technology, and culture. All education grants, trusts, and public universities were targets since the beginning of Morena’s political victories. The party politicized and destabilized all these education and research institutions through ideological appointments. But this antipathy towards culture and education is far from a return to the past. Lopez Obrador’s administration dismantled the National Institute for the Evaluation of Education, defunded research centers, and criminally prosecuted academics. Previous governments supported public universities and understood them as an investment to train future public servants. Similarly, the attack against education echoes an idea about social mobility and poverty that contrasts with the former regime. While the former regime supported the importance of growing the middle class.  Morena, like most populist movements, feeds itself by propagating poverty; it needs it to fuel fear and resentment.

Third, the PRI understood and promoted two critical separations in modern states: the division between church and state and between the civil and military spheres. Mexico had a very clear division between civil government and the military during most of the 20th century, while Morena has built an intertwined political partnership with the armed forces incompatible with any modern democracy, a toxic partnership that has only boosted corruption and human rights abuses.

Fourth, throughout the 20th century, Mexico maintained a respected foreign policy upheld by a professional foreign service adept at navigating complex relations, especially during the Cold War. The country valued multilateralism, adhered to international law, and extended support to thousands of political refugees from Europe and Latin America. In contrast, Morena has aligned itself with authoritarian regimes in the region, offering political sanctuary to their leaders, granting Putin the neutrality and false equivalency he anxiously pursues in the Ukrainian conflict, and treating migrants as a bargaining chip in the US-Mexico bilateral relationship. The loss of Mexico’s hard-earned prestige in foreign affairs is not a return to the past.

Lastly, there are ways to concentrate power. The prevailing analysis of Mexico as an archetypal concentration of power is insufficient. Morena lacks the political foresight and long-term planning that characterized periods of Mexico’s past: the paradox of Morena’s approach to centralizing power is that it requires destroying the institutions that ultimately create leverage, order, and governability. The power coming from Sheinbaum’s landslide victory is relative and will never be sufficient to fill the vacuum left by the destruction of most of Mexico’s institutions. By legalizing arbitrariness and destroying checks and balances, Morena has fallen into a trap of their own making; by eliminating everything they thought was obstructing their way, the new ruling group also eliminated the channels to allocate accountability and process conflicts. No one is left to blame for Mexico’s ungovernability and security crisis. Political projects that eliminate pluralism and opposition frequently create a set-up by eliminating channels to redirect responsibility. Not sharing power also means not sharing the consequences.

Historical analogies should be used with care. Although, in the past, the president carried a particular heft in the political system, there was, in parallel, a tendency to depersonalize political actions through institutions. The current frenzy involving the cannibalization of wide swathes of the state stands in contrast to the past regime’s emphasis on discipline and stability. Although through democratic means, the PRI offered guarantees underpinned by institutions; certain predictability sustained by professional bureaucracies, which, in tandem, provided guardrails to process conflict and sustain governability over time. As Oscar Wilde warned about wishes, Morena will soon be a victim of its success.

Emiliano Polo holds a master’s degree in Global Affairs and International Security. He currently works in the Americas Program at CSIS.

Global Americans takes pride in serving as a platform that offers in-depth analyses on various political, economic, environmental, and foreign affairs issues in the Western Hemisphere. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Global Americans or anyone associated with it, and publication by Global Americans does not constitute an endorsement of all or any part of the views expressed.

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