[EnglishArticle]Latin America’s fraught regional politics and Brazil’s domestic woes seeped into the recent UN climate change talks in Bonn, Germany. During the conference, the Brazilian Environment Minister, José Sarney Filho, announced Brazil’s interest in hosting the 25th Conference of the Parties (COP25) in 2019. Brazil is currently the only country to declare its interest to the Executive Secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to host the negotiations, which are slated to take place in a Latin American and Caribbean country.
Following diplomatic protocol, aspiring COP presidents submit letters to the UNFCCC and then the UN regional group, in this case the 33-country strong group for Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC), discuss the issue before reaching a decision via consensus. While GRULAC has regular meetings during the COP, discussions about future COP presidencies can be lengthy. Both informal and formal meetings take place among GRULAC representatives in New York, among diplomats at the COP and through countries’ individual diplomatic channels.
Despite GRULAC’s failure to reach a decision among its members in Bonn, on the last day of the talks a draft decision on “Dates and venues of future sessions” named Brazil as the COP25 host in 2019. But later that day, the adopted version of the decision failed to mention Brazil and requested that the UN climate talks next April consider the issue.
A UNFCCC staffer said that they had received communication from GRULAC’s monthly rotating president—Paraguay—confirming Brazil’s COP25 candidacy. They then received a separate communication from Paraguay stating that the issue was in fact not yet settled. Two anonymous sources said that Paraguay informed the UNFCCC that GRULAC had apparently endorsed Brazil’s COP25, which provided the green light to include it in the conference decision.
But that didn’t mean that GRULAC had reached a decision. On viewing the draft conference decision, Venezuela and Brazil raised concerns that the group was not ready and that further discussions would take place among GRULAC representatives in New York.
In GRULAC’s defense, during the fast paced and hectic two weeks of talks, mistakes can happen. Over-burdened delegates charged with negotiating for their countries, also have to shepherd ministers or presidents and attend bilateral meetings. At the COP, GRULAC meetings also occur at lunchtime, ensuring delegates may be caught in the negotiations or coordinating in smaller groups simultaneously. In this environment wires can get crossed and important messages can be sent too late, too early, or simply misinterpreted.
On an issue of this magnitude, however, it is possible that the incident may have been more than a simple mistake. It is possible that Paraguay may have sent the letter to the UNFCCC with confirmation of GRULAC’s support for Brazil’s bid since it wished to curry favor with its powerful neighbor so as to avoid a lengthy and potentially inconclusive discussion within GRULAC.
Latin American and Caribbean regional politics are at the most fractious they’ve been for some time due to the crisis in Venezuela. In August, foreign ministers of several countries including Paraguay, Mexico, Brazil, Peru and Argentina signed the Lima Declaration, which strongly criticized the Maduro regime and the breakdown of democratic order in Venezuela. Adding to the tense state of affairs is the fact that seven Latin American countries will elect new presidents in the next year, which could be creating a flap across ministries as they attempt to conclude their agendas given the customary overhaul of ministers and civil servants.
Anticipating that Venezuela may not want to support Brazil’s COP bid, Paraguay could have acted to try and push through the confirmation quickly to avoid any clashes within GRULAC. Venezuela may have been particularly unwilling to accept Brazil’s bid due to its own interest in hosting the conference following a failed bid in 2014 to host COP20, which it lost to Peru.
In the event that GRULAC cannot reach consensus on a COP host, the UNFCCC would skip the region’s host year and organize the conference in another region. This worst-case scenario would be the second time the Venezuelan crisis has undermined a major regional event. Responding to the escalating situation, the Grupo de Lima in August called for the postponement of the summit between Europe and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.
With protracted and likely prickly discussions between GRULAC representatives, Brazil’s candidacy is by no means in the bag. Brazilian domestic politics could also pose a problem.
Brazilian environmental organizations spearheaded the effort to host COP25. In a significant victory, Environment Minister José Sarney Filho, who is seen as a climate champion and ally of these groups, accepted their proposal. These groups argue that during a time of various setbacks for Brazil’s climate and environmental agenda, hosting a COP could be a way to lock-in attention on these issues, especially in the context of the 2018 presidential election. For example, last year, Brazil’s greenhouse gases emissions are estimated to have risen 8.9%, the highest level since 2008, mainly due to an increase in agriculture and illegal deforestation .
There is hope that with increased international exposure, President Michele Temer’s administration and the presidential candidates will give greater attention to the environment and climate policies. Drawing on Brazil’s well organized and technically savvy civil society and engaged press, the COP could be used to deter further setbacks and gain greater support from the international community to pressure Brazilian leaders to push climate change and environmental issues up the agenda. Brazil’s next president, who will take office in January 2019, would be holding a major international event, providing these groups and environmentally concerned policymakers with an opportunity to advance more ambitious climate and environmental goals in the government’s first year in office.
Organizing a COP also provides an opportunity for Brazil to re-establish its presence on the international stage following a period of introspection and a low-key foreign policy. Historically, advancing global climate change governance has been one of Brazil’s main foreign policy strengths.
But with the ongoing crises in Brazil this could prove a risky strategy. Observers were immediately reminded that the Temer administration has not demonstrated strong commitment to tackling climate change. On the same day that Brazil made its COP25 offer, it won the Climate Action Network’s Fossil of the Day Award, an award given to environmental laggards, for a bill sent to Congress by President Temer that would subsidize new oil development by about $300 billion.
Brazil’s cabinet is set to undergo a major shakeup in the coming weeks, which could also interfere with its COP bid. Environment Minister Filho will likely stay put until next March or April before resigning to run for the Senate. It is hoped that while he remains in office he can use his position to encourage cabinet colleagues to fight to secure the nomination. It is not confirmed whether Brazil’s foreign minister, Aloysio Nunes, will stay on or leave office. While his successor would probably continue to support the COP25 bid, the political upheaval of a cabinet reshuffle raises concerns that the Temer administration might not be able or willing to work to secure the nomination, especially if other countries are not overly supportive.
Brazil’s Foreign Ministry is said to be uneasy about the bid. Brazil is scheduled to host the 11th BRICS Summit in 2019, which could be seen as more important than the COP to project Brazil’s foreign policy goals and credentials. Cost is also a concern. The hosting of a COP with 20,000 participants and the diplomatic capital required to pull it off comes with a hefty price tag.
Hosting a successful COP also requires adeptly facilitating the process, building trust among countries, demonstrating strong domestic climate action, and massive planning and organization. As COP25 is set to be one of the most important events since the 2015 Paris Agreement, Brazil would be faced with an enormous task.
COP25 is especially important because in 2020, countries are due to submit revised national climate change plans. The 2017 UN Emissions Gap Report shows that countries’ current targets to reduce emissions would lead to a temperature rise of roughly 3 degrees Celsius by 2100. To meet the Paris temperature goal of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees, emissions must peak by 2020 and then drop steadily. Brazil is one of the countries whose pledge is currently incompatible with the Paris goal. Pressure is mounting on all countries (especially future COP presidents) to raise the ambitions of their targets before 2020.
With high levels of domestic political volatility and regional politics at a decidedly difficult juncture, the odds are long that Brazil’s COP25 bid pans out. Brazil, however, appears keen to take that gamble.
Note: The governments of Paraguay and Venezuela did not respond to requests for comment.
Guy Edwards is research fellow and co-director of the Climate and Development Lab at Brown University. He is coauthor of A Fragmented Continent: Latin America and the Global Politics of Climate Change (MIT Press, 2015)
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La política regional de América Latina y los problemas propios de Brasil se han filtrado en las recientes negociaciones sobre cambio climático de la ONU en Bonn, Alemania. En el marco de la conferencia, José Sarney Filho—Ministro de Medio Ambiente de Brasil—planteó el interés del país de ser la sede de la 25ª Conferencia (COP25) en 2019.
Brasil es actualmente el único país que ha manifestado al Secretario Ejecutivo de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático (CMNUCC) su interés de convertirse en sede de las negociaciones, las cuales están programadas para llevarse a cabo en un país de América Latina y el Caribe.
Siguiendo el protocolo, los candidatos a la presidencia de la COP deben presentar cartas de solicitud a la CMNUCC. Posteriormente, el grupo regional de la ONU, en este caso al grupo de 33 países de América Latina y el Caribe (GRULAC), discuten el tema antes de tomar una decisión por consenso. Si bien el GRULAC lleva a cabo reuniones regulares durante la COP, las discusiones sobre futuras presidencias de la COP pueden ser mucho más extensas.
En el último día de las conversaciones, un proyecto de decisión de la conferencia efectivamente nombró a Brasil como el anfitrión de la COP25. Pero aparentemente el presidente rotatorio mensual del GRULAC, en este caso Paraguay, notificó prematuramente a la Secretaría de la CMNUCC que el GRULAC había aceptado la candidatura de Brasil. Al ver el proyecto de decisión de la conferencia, Venezuela y Brasil expresaron su preocupación ante la indecisión y la poca preparación del grupo. La decisión corregida sobre la conferencia no menciona a Brasil y se encuentra a la espera de que el GRULAC reanude las discusiones.
En defensa del GRULAC, durante las dos intensas semanas de negociaciones, pueden ocurrir errores. Los cables se cruzan y mensajes importantes pueden enviarse demasiado tarde o demasiado temprano o simplemente malinterpretarse. Durante este período de alta tensión política regional, las decisiones se toman sobre arena movediza.
También se debe tomar en cuenta que el ambiente político de América Latina y el Caribe se encuentra en su punto más difícil desde hace algún tiempo debido a la crisis en Venezuela. En agosto, los ministros de relaciones exteriores de varios países, entre ellos Paraguay, México, Brasil, Perú y Argentina, firmaron la Declaración de Lima, que se pronuncia enérgicamente contra el régimen de Maduro y el quebrantamiento del orden democrático en Venezuela.
Es posible que Paraguay enviase la carta a la CMNUCC confirmando la candidatura de Brasil, deseando evitar un debate interminable dentro del GRULAC. No resulta extraño pensar que Paraguay podría haber actuado para tratar de impulsar la confirmación evitando cualquier enfrentamiento dentro del GRULAC, ante una negativa de Venezuela de apoyar la oferta de Brasil debido a su propio interés en ser sede de la conferencia, luego de una oferta fallida en 2014 para ser sede de la COP20, que perdió frente a Perú.
Pero en el caso de que el GRULAC no pueda llegar a un consenso sobre la futura sede de la COP, la Secretaría de la Convención seleccionaría otra región en su lugar. Esta sería la segunda vez que la crisis venezolana termina socavando un importante evento regional. Recordemos que el Grupo de Lima pidió en agosto que se pospusiera la cumbre entre Europa y la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y del Caribe.
Dadas las extensas y espinosas discusiones entre los representantes del GRULAC, la candidatura de Brasil no está del todo asegurada. Por otro lado, la política doméstica del Brasil también podría plantear un riesgo.
El gabinete brasileño atravesará un periodo de reorganización durante las próximas semanas, que podría interferir con los esfuerzos para asegurar su oferta en la COP, partiendo del hecho de que no se ha confirmado si el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Brasil, Aloysio Nunes, mantendrá su posición. Si bien es probable que su sucesor continúe apoyando la celebración de la COP25, la agitación política, producto de una reorganización, podría menoscabar la postura de la administración de Temer de invertir la energía necesaria para garantizar la nominación. Por otro lado, es probable que el ministro de medio ambiente, Filho, mantenga su posición hasta el próximo mes de marzo, antes de renunciar para postularse para el Senado. Se espera que mientras permanezca en el cargo continúe luchando junto con otros miembros del gabinete para asegurar la nominación.
No obstante, se rumora que el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Brasil está inquieto con la oferta. Simplemente el costo de organizar un evento para recibir a 20,000 delegados, incluyendo una veintena de ministros y jefes de estado, es bastante elevado. Asimismo, organizar una COP exitosa requiere no solamente de facilitar la logística del proceso, sino de generar confianza entre los países y demostrar una política doméstica contra el cambio climático con líneas de acción claras y convincentes. Dado que la COP25 se configura como uno de los eventos más importantes desde el Acuerdo de París 2015, Brasil se enfrentaría a una tarea titánica.
La COP25 es también importante ya que en 2020, los países deberán someter a revisión sus planes nacionales contra el cambio climático. El Informe de Emisiones de la ONU de 2017 revela que las metas actuales de los países para reducir las emisiones conducirían a un aumento de la temperatura en aproximadamente 3º Celsius hacia el 2100. Para cumplir con el objetivo de la temperatura acordada en París de limitar el calentamiento a 1.5º Celsius, el nivel de emisiones deberá alcanzar su punto máximo en 2020 para luego descender constantemente. Brasil es uno de los países cuya promesa actualmente es incompatible con el objetivo de París y la presión aumenta en todos los países para elevar los niveles de sus objetivos.
En la actualidad, el compromiso mostrado por la administración de Temer para enfrentar el cambio climático es cuestionable. El mismo día que Brasil hizo su oferta COP25, el país ganó el premio “Fossil of the Day” de la Red de Acción Climática, un premio otorgado a países en calidad de rezago ambiental, como resultado de un proyecto de ley enviado al Congreso por el presidente Temer que subsidiará el nuevo desarrollo petrolero en aproximadamente $300 mil millones de dólares. También se estima que las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero alcanzadas el año pasado aumentaron un 8.9%, el nivel más alto desde 2008, principalmente debido a un aumento en actividades de agricultura y deforestación ilegal.
La debilidad de la agenda climática de Temer ayuda a explicar por qué Brasil presentó una propuesta para ser sede de la conferencia. Un grupo de organizaciones ambientales brasileñas lograron persuadir al ministro Filho de que presentara la propuesta argumentando que en un momento de varios reveses para la agenda climática y ambiental de Brasil, organizar una COP podría ser una forma de aumentar la atención sobre estos temas y lograr un cambio de dirección.
Con los altos niveles de volatilidad política interna y la política regional en una coyuntura sumamente difícil, las probabilidades de que la nominación de Brasil para albergar la COP25 se alargue son muchas. Brasil, sin embargo, parece estar dispuesto a seguir jugando con las cartas sobre la mesa.
Nota: Los gobiernos de Paraguay y Venezuela no respondieron a las solicitudes de comentarios.
Guy Edwards es investigador y c-odirector del Laboratorio de Clima y Desarrollo de la Universidad de Brown. Es también co-autor de la obra “A Fragmented Continent: Latin America and the Global Politics of Climate Change” (MIT Press, 2015)
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