Image Source: BBC News.
Either in office or out, Dési Bouterse cast a long shadow over Suriname, having been a coup leader in 1980, the power behind the throne for several heads of state (ousting one of them in a bloodless coup), and serving two terms (2010-2020) as an elected president. He was also a convicted murderer and drug trafficker. He died at the age of 79 of liver failure linked to excessive drinking while hiding in an unknown location to which he fled before he was supposed to start a prison term for the December 1982 murders of political opponents.
Bouterse’s death brought mixed reactions in Suriname, though the commentary has largely remained respectful. For its part, the government of President Chan Santokhi, whose coalition won the 2020 elections, delivered a measured response, deciding against a state funeral and with no military honors, but flying the flag at half-mast. Nonetheless, the former president’s passing was clearly an awkward moment in Surinamese politics.
Bouterse’s successor Santokhi inherited a major mess in both economic and governance terms, which was followed by several tough years of economic austerity, structural adjustment, and lengthy debt renegotiations. Sadly, the high hopes that followed Bouterse’s 2020 electoral defeat gave way to public frustration with the new government over economic affairs, worsened by new corruption scandals and major questions over the government’s willingness to provide better transparency and disclosure.
Suriname is now in election mode, with a vote set for May 2025. Although Bouterse may be gone, his ghost hovers over the country. One newspaper has already suggested establishing a truth commission, noting: “Now that Bouterse has passed away, it might be worth investigating whether it makes sense to start a process of truth-finding, as happened in South Africa after the apartheid regime fell. Suriname’s development will be able to proceed more quickly if there is a certain degree of unity among the population.”
While the idea of a possible “truth commission” appeals to some elements of Suriname’s society, it could sharpen societal divisions as the country heads into its upcoming election. Many in the lead opposition party, Bouterse’s National Democratic Party (NDP or Nationale Democratische Partij), still hold him in high regard.As an editorial in Starnieuws observed: “Bouterse’s legacy is deeply intertwined with the contradictions within society. On the one hand, there are his supporters, who continue to see him as a liberator from a corrupt elite and a strong leader who stood up for national pride. On the other hand, there is a growing group who see him as a tyrant, responsible for untold suffering and the undermining of democratic values.”
One of the major challenges for the Santokhi government in the run-up to the May 2025 election is to maintain political stability, which means keeping the country’s ethnic differences in check. Suriname’s small population of 625,000 people is probably one of the most diverse in the world, consisting of Creoles, Maroons (the descendants of escaped African enslaved people, often with some indigenous heritage as well), the descendants of Indian and Javanese indentured laborers, people of European descent, and Indigenous peoples.
There is some overlap between political party and ethnic identification, though not at the same level as in neighboring Guyana, which has seen ethnic tensions occasionally bubble up. The major ruling party, the Progressive Reform Party (VHP or Vooruitstrevende Hervromingspartij), has a support base in the Indo-Surinamese community and its coalition partner, ABOP (Algemene Bevrijdings-en Ontwikkelingspartij), draws support from the Maroon community. President Santohki is of Indian descent and Vice President Ronnie Brunswijk is from the Maroon community. Bouterse’s old party, the NDP, is probably the most multiracial of the mix. Yet another party, the National Party of Suriname (NPS) has in the past drawn support mostly from the Creole community.
While reconciliation with Bouterse’s passing cannot be ignored, there are other issues hanging over Suriname which will likely prove more impactful in the coming election.
The first is the state of the economy. The Santokhi government is stressing that the economy is finally improving and finding its way out of the Bouterse-induced multiyear crisis. Supporting this view, inflation has fallen, and real GDP growth is estimated at 3.0 percent for the year, with an IMF forecast of 3.2 percent for 2025. The message here will be to stick with the VHP and its allies as the good times are around the corner, which will obviously be disputed by the opposition parties.
The second election issue also concerns the economy, but with a focus on the income from the country’s burgeoning oil and gas sector. Suriname’s hydrocarbon sector is in the process of getting a major upgrade, with France’s TotalEnergies and its US partner APA Corporation committing $10.5 billion to develop the GranMorgu oil project in the country’s Block 58, with the first oil expected to flow in 2028. With an eye to the coming election, the ruling coalition has already announced plans as to how to share the coming wealth. While opposition parties are unlikely to dispute the need to share the wealth, many will argue the VHP are not the right party to trust with that responsibility.
A third issue is governance. It can be argued that one of Bouterse’s chief legacies is corruption, and it has remained a problem. With the potential for oil wealth in the not-too-far distant future, voters will consider which party will be the best steward of national wealth, the VHP, NDP, ABOP, or a handful of smaller parties. Or will corruption skew oil wealth to a few insiders and put Suriname on the same track as Angola, Nigeria, and Venezuela?
Although geopolitics is not likely to be a major issue in the May 2025 elections, it also looms over Suriname. The American president-elect has indicated that the United States will play a stronger role in the Americas: threatening Canada and Mexico with tariffs unless the borders are tightened, asking Denmark to sell Greenland to the United States (for national security reasons), and threatening to reassert the United States’ control over the Panama Canal. China is one of the major factors in all of this. It is doubtful that future Chinese advances will be left unchallenged. This includes in Suriname.
China has its hooks in Suriname. The Caribbean country joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during the Bouterse years in 2018. Chinese companies have been active in national infrastructure, including airport roads, the Regional Hospital Wancia, and the Suriname Agricultural Technical Cooperation Center, as well as Chinese establishing companies, shops, and financial institutions. Chinese companies are currently active in seeking to revive the country’s bauxite sector and construct a bridge linking Guyana and Suriname. While much of this occurred during the Bouterse years, with the then-president visiting Beijing in November 2019, the debt issue remains a sore point representative of what U.S. China hawks call debt-trap diplomacy.
China is Suriname’s largest sovereign lender and made the restructuring process tortuous and lengthy, as if to make the point all the clearer that Beijing has leverage over Suriname. While Santokhi was able to quickly restructure Suriname’s debt with other sovereign lenders, it was only in November 2024 that an agreement was concluded covering Suriname’s debt to the Chinese state-owned Exim Bank for $476 million, of which $140 million were in arrears, as well as another $68 million owed to Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Suriname still represents an opportunity for China, but much will hinge on what happens in the May 2025 elections. Dési Bouterse is gone, and Suriname is beginning its next phase, a process that will be reinforced by the elections. Suriname has considerable potential to forge a more democratic future and properly manage what could be a windfall of oil money. It was humanitarian theologian Albert Schweitzer who stated, “Example is leadership.” Whoever assumes the leadership mantle in the May 2025 election should look closely at Bouterse’s example, both the good and the bad; there is decidedly something that can be learned from it.
Scott B. MacDonald is Chief Economist at Smith’s Research & Gradings, Senior Fellow at Global Americans, and Founding Member of the Caribbean Policy Consortium.
Global Americans takes pride in serving as a platform that offers in-depth analyses on various political, economic, environmental, and foreign affairs issues in the Western Hemisphere. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Global Americans or anyone associated with it, and publication by Global Americans does not constitute an endorsement of all or any part of the views expressed.
