Image Source: World Vision.
Immigration is a sensitive matter throughout the Americas. In the United States, it is one of the major issues in the presidential campaign. It is also a serious subject throughout the rest of the Western Hemisphere, where governments are scrambling to contend with the region’s largest migration of people in contemporary times. One of the largest groups of people on the move is Venezuelans. Nicólas Maduro’s blatant theft of the July 28th, 2024, election and a new wave of repression are likely to push more Venezuelans out of their country. Is the rest of the Western Hemisphere ready for this?
Venezuela is the one of the world’s leading exporters of its own people. Although the total number of migrants (those who cross borders for work, education or family reunification) is posted at 8 million, the country ranks third in refugees (those who are forced to flee to escape war, violence and other situations that threaten their lives or freedom) behind Afghanistan and Syria (at 6.4 million each), at 6.1 million people. Over the past decade it is estimated that three million Venezuelans have gone to Colombia, 1.5 million to Peru, with others heading Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Spain and United States. Large numbers have also trekked to the smaller Caribbean countries, including Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia and two self-governing constituent countries of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Aruba and Curaçao.
The backdrop to Venezuela’s great migration is a combination of gross economic mismanagement, fluctuating oil prices, systemic corruption, and U.S.-led sanctions resulting in an economic contraction of 80 percent from 2014 to 2021. On top of that was a bout of hyperinflation, which in 2018 peaked at 63,374 percent, which had an immense impact on most people’s lives. Although hyperinflation was broken, inflation is still high, projected at 100 percent for 2024, still the highest in Latin America and the Caribbean.
To this can be added high levels of crime. According to data from the Mexico City-based Citizen Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice, Caracas is the world’s third most violent city, while two other Venezuelan cities made the top 10.
Furthermore, the country’s political life has been marked by repression, with the military solidly aligned behind the regime, in addition to loyalist courts and puppet legislative body. Cuban security forces have helped design the country’s security apparatus and China, Russia, and Iran have all contributed to varying degrees in keeping the regime afloat.
The July election was looked upon with considerable hope. Many Venezuelans who had left their country were considering returning if Maduro lost. As one Venezuelan in Trinidad stated before the July 28th elections, “If the President changes I will go back home. I want to go back home, but the economy in Venezuela is not good.” Sadly, Maduro cheated and remains very much in power, crushing hopes for change.
The challenge for the Western Hemisphere is that even more Venezuelans are considering leaving their country. According to a poll by local pollster Meganálisis, 40 percent of Venezuela’s population might leave their country in the aftermath of the stolen election. The country’s current population stands at 28 million. Rubén Chirinos, president of Meganálisis, stated: “The main driver of this desire to migrate is the perception that Maduro will retain power because people associate his regime with economic problems, repression and lack of freedom.”
For those countries that received earlier waves of Venezuelans this is troubling. The surge of people fleeing from Maduro’s socialist dystopia has already stretched social services throughout the neighboring South American and Caribbean countries. Moreover, fair or not, Venezuelans are increasingly associated with rising levels of crime, a situation not helped by the overseas expansion of Tren de Aragua, one of the country’s most violent gangs. The gang is linked with human trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, money laundering, contract killings, smuggling and organized retail theft from Panama to Brazil and among Andean countries and in the U.S.
Maduro has often been underestimated as a leader, but he has outwitted other contenders and put into place what many have described as a narco-state, with many of the country’s top civilian and military leaders directly or indirectly involved in regime-backed drug trafficking. He could well remain in power for many more years. Will Venezuela become a larger Cuba, an ideologically bankrupt regime backed by armed force and willing to export troublemakers and the disgruntled?
One potential ripple effect is that a new round of Venezuelan migrants could strain relations with the democratic left, especially those countries that share borders with Venezuela and have substantial trade relations. Over the past two years Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has sought to bring Maduro in from the diplomatic cold and promoted the ideas of elections and human rights.
In Colombia, Gustavo Petro, the country’s first leftist president, also has sought to mend broken diplomatic bridges with his neighbor. Brazil and Colombia, along with Mexico (headed by the leftist-populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador) are seeking to broker a solution to Venezuela’s crisis. However, Maduro has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to make agreements that he has no intention of honoring. How are these governments going to respond to Maduro spurning their efforts while potentially sending new waves of migrants to their countries?
A renewed flow Venezuelans seeking entry into the United States will also be problematic. According to a July 2024 Gallup poll, 55 percent of Americans want to see less immigration, the highest level since 2001. Part of U.S. angst over the huge influx of migrants is the stress put on social systems throughout the country as resources have become scarcer in many cities. There are also concerns that Maduro is weaponizing immigration, much as Cuba and Nicaragua have done by facilitating the movement of regime opponents from their countries to the U.S.
Immigration is also a major political issue in the U.S. presidential contest. The Republican candidate, former President Donald Trump, wants massive deportations of unauthorized migrants and to finish the wall. He would also probably break with Latin American leaders and take a harder line on economic sanctions vis-à-vis Venezuela, which would worsen conditions inside the Latin American country.
A Harris administration might be more inclined to follow the lead of democratically elected Latin American leaders on Venezuela, while taking a tougher stance on the border. Dubbed as the “border czar” by the media and Republicans early in the Biden administration, Harris cannot take the same approach to Venezuela as with the Northern Triangle countries which were provided a long-term strategy to deal with the root causes for migration. Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador have a more constructive relationship with the U.S.; Venezuela is openly anti-U.S. and would be happy to use migration against it.
Another surge in Venezuelan migration is also likely to provide more business for human trafficking organizations. Globally human trafficking is lucrative, estimated to worth as much as $10 billion a year. Most Latin American and Caribbean countries have been forced to upgrade their immigration policies and rethink border policies in light of the growing industry. At the same time, international organization like the Organization of American States and the United Nations have provided support better equipping authorities to prevent migrant smuggling, prosecuting the perpetrators and assisting the migrants. Nonetheless, if there is demand, human trafficking organizations are willing to meet it, despite government efforts throughout the region. And there remains considerable demand from Venezuelans.
There may or may not be a new surge of Venezuelan migration. However, the odds are stacked for a greater number of people voting with their feet. If migration is going to be made manageable, ultimately the solution is political and in the home of the migrants. Venezuela, like many of the countries from which people flee, needs better governance, which provides a stronger foundation for economic growth, stability and security, and hopefully a more equitable sharing of national wealth.
Venezuela was corrupt and poorly managed before the Chávez-Maduro era; the irony is that the regime that was supposed to rule on the behalf of the people has proven much more effective in forcing them to leave. Short of a political solution and an economic overhaul, largescale Venezuelan migration probably will continue to loom large over the Americas for years to come.
Scott B. MacDonald is Chief Economist at Smith’s Research & Gradings, Senior Fellow at Global Americans, and Founding Member of the Caribbean Policy Consortium.
