Image Source: Bloomberg.
There is, and never has been, any history of enmity between the Guyanese and Venezuelan peoples. There is nothing like the historic animosity between the English and French, born out of centuries of rivalry and mutual distrust. On the other hand, for more than 60 years, Venezuelans have been conditioned from the cradle to believe that Guyana’s Essequibo region belongs to them because of the perfidious behavior of Guyana’s colonizing power, the United Kingdom. It is an attitude that belies any pretense of good neighborliness and moreover flies in the face of international law and the 1899 Arbitral Award which delineated the border between then British Guiana and Venezuela.
Having accepted the Arbitral Award for decades, Venezuela resurrected its claim to the Essequibo region in 1962, contending that the Award was “null and void”. This spurious claim was based on the posthumous, unsubstantiated ramblings of one of the junior members of Venezuela’s delegation to the Arbitral Tribunal, who alleged that the UK and Russia somehow conspired against Venezuela (and its advocate – the United States). No evidence of this supposed collusion has ever been found.
In the lead-up to Guyana’s Independence in 1966, representatives of the UK, Venezuela, and Guyana met in Geneva in February and signed an Agreement aimed at finding “satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom which has arisen as the result of the Venezuelan contention.” In October 1966, however, Venezuela illegally took possession of Guyana’s half of Ankoko Island in the Cuyuni River, in breach of the letter and spirit of the Geneva Agreement. Thus began a history of provocations by Venezuela, culminating in the most recent outrages: the completion and commissioning of a bridge, in December 2024, linking the Venezuelan side of the Cuyuni with its military outpost on Ankoko; and the announcement, on January 7, 2025, by Nicolás Maduro, of a plan to elect a “Governor of the Guayana Esequiba” by “the people of Guayana Esequiba”.
The latest acts of aggression should be regarded against the backdrop of the selection by the UN Secretary General, in January 2018, of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the means of settling the border controversy, in keeping with the terms of the Geneva Agreement, and the escalation of the matter by the Maduro regime in 2023. With Guyana taking the legal high ground at the ICJ and the Venezuelan political and economic climate continuing its precipitous decline, Maduro began a war of words in September 2023, to deflect criticism of his regime’s handling of the case and to distract people from their daily woes and his own deep unpopularity. To cap it all, he held a “Consultative Referendum”, on December 3, 2023, in defiance of the ICJ’s provisional measures of December 1, 2023, ordering Venezuela “to refrain from taking any action which would modify the situation” in Essequibo. The Referendum paved the way for the creation of the so-called “Guayana Esequiba state”, an annexation of Guyanese sovereign territory by decree.
In the face of Maduro’s saber-rattling and with tension and fears of invasion building, some leaders in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) persuaded Guyana to attend a meeting with Venezuela in St Vincent and the Grenadines. The meeting allowed Venezuela to claim that “bilateral discussions” over the border were continuing despite Guyana making it clear that the border was not up for discussion and that there was an ongoing process at the ICJ, bilateral processes long since having been exhausted.
The advocates of the meeting hailed the Argyle Declaration coming out of it as de-escalating the crisis and setting the scene for peaceful relations between the two countries. Even though Guyana had not in any way threatened Venezuela, Argyle committed both countries to (amongst other things): not threatening or using force directly or indirectly; being good neighbors; avoiding escalation; and establishing a joint commission of Foreign Ministers, which was, illogically, tantamount to a reopening of bilateral discussions parallel to the ICJ process.
Almost immediately, Venezuela broke the agreement with troop buildups and the expansion of the military base on Ankoko, evident in satellite images reported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Caracas then moved to give effect to the results of the referendum with a unilateral decision in April 2024 that the two-thirds of Guyana it claims was now officially part of Venezuela and its Guyanese inhabitants, Venezuelan citizens. The recent move on Ankoko and the plan to elect a “Governor of the Guayana Esequiba” are further evidence of the contempt the rogue regime in Venezuela holds for Argyle, the Government of Guyana and the international order. Yet some, including CARICOM members dependent on Venezuelan largesse, refuse to condemn Venezuela’s actions.
In contrast, the Commonwealth and countries such as Brazil, the UK, and U.S. have been clear in their support for Guyana’s territorial integrity.
Russia, on the other hand, is a staunch supporter of Venezuela, eager to make mischief in the United States’ backyard in an attempt to divert attention away from Ukraine. As no respecter of territorial integrity itself, it clearly has no problems with Venezuelan actions.
China is desperate to try and keep out of the issue wanting to maintain good relations with both Guyana and Venezuela for pragmatic economic reasons. It will most likely continue with its public stance of studied neutrality.
Meanwhile President Donald Trump has made clear that Venezuela can expect short shrift from his administration. Guyana-U.S. relations have become increasingly close over the past decade. Relations with the second Trump administration are expected to be even stronger with Marco Rubio as Secretary of State. It will be recalled that President Irfaan Ali met with Rubio in September 2023 and the Senator had called on the Biden administration to “put together more robust support for Guyana so that the ally nation can benefit from its natural resources.” Guyana should leverage the U.S. view of Guyana as an ally and strategic partner in the region to strengthen its hand in the face of Venezuelan aggression.
In the face of Venezuela’s actions on Ankoko, Foreign Minister Hugh Todd met with Venezuela’s Ambassador in Georgetown, on December 19, 2024, to provide, among other things, an “update” regarding Guyana’s submission to the ICJ on December 9, 2024 and to register a “formal protest” against the building of the bridge to Ankoko.
Notably, Todd did not summon the Ambassador for a diplomatic dressing down and one can only surmise that this approach reflects the confidence of the government in the merits of its case at the ICJ and a certain measure of satisfaction that it has enough U.S. support to tread softly in the face of the most outrageous border provocations.
Maduro’s announcement of plans to hold elections in the Essequibo has elicited a somewhat firmer response from the Guyana Foreign Ministry, this time in the nature of a strongly worded diplomatic note of protest. President Ali has also stated that Guyana’s lawyers have “apprised the court on this development and all international organizations such as the Commonwealth, the CARICOM, have been asked to share the content with their membership.”
But Guyana can do more.
In our view, there is need for more robust diplomacy, starting with bringing the issue to the UN Security Council (UNSC), of which Guyana is currently a non-permanent member, as it did in April 2024, to protest Venezuela’s actions aimed at annexing the Essequibo region.
Notifying the Council of such a clear breach of territorial integrity allows clear statements to be made at the highest level of multilateral diplomacy and will show who the real blockers are to halting Venezuela’s provocations.
Articles 34 and 35(1) of the UN Charter allow this to happen:
“Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 35
- Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.”
A continuing Venezuelan refusal to accept that the ICJ has jurisdiction and to abide by the Court’s provisional measures, should allow the Security Council, if it deems it appropriate, to invoke Article 37(1) of the UN Charter:
“Article 37
- Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.”
For clarity, Article 33(1) says:
“Article 33
- The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”
Let us be clear: we are not advocating a different means of settlement because Venezuela refuses to recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Rather, we believe that recourse to the UNSC is necessary in light of Venezuela’s continued provocations and defiance of international law. The UNSC would then be in a position to insist that Venezuela abide by the process selected by the UN Secretary General and the rulings of the ICJ. At the very least it would show its desire for this issue to be settled by the body most relevant to doing so, that is, the ICJ.
Such a move to the Security Council would also put Russia in a difficult position. Placing it in a situation to decide whether to support another breach of territorial integrity provides an opportunity to show how little Russia respects international law. China would also face a difficult choice, and the Trump administration would like nothing more than placing China in an uncomfortable position.
Will any decision at the UNSC change the situation on the ground? Maybe not, but it brings the issue out into the open, allows for some measure of censure for such blatant Venezuelan abuse, and also puts a marker down just in case they might consider taking further steps. Parallel to this, Guyanese diplomats abroad should be going into overdrive to present Guyana’s position to their bilateral hosts and to regional caucuses, and to expose Venezuela’s dangerous actions for the threat they pose not only to Guyana’s sovereignty and territorial integrity but also to regional security and international peace.
Guyana is in the right on this. The Maduro regime sees how oil is making Guyana rich and clearly wants part of that as it tries to deal with its mismanagement of the economy. And Maduro continues to use Essequibo as a distraction, as he clings to power after having lost the election of July 2024.
Bad and illegal behavior by Venezuela should not be accepted, especially when it has no justification historically or in the modern day. Time, therefore, for the Security Council to get involved and for Guyana to use all the diplomatic tools at its disposal.
Riyad Insanally, CCH is a former Guyanese career diplomat, who last served as Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States, from 2016 to 2021. He is now an international relations consultant and, among other things, a member of Diplomats Without Borders, Fellow with the Caribbean Policy Consortium and non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Center for Latin America.
Greg Quinn, OBE is a former British career diplomat, who was High Commissioner to Guyana from 2015 to 2020. He now runs his own government relations, business development and crisis management consultancy: Aodhan Consultancy Ltd (www.aodhaninc.co.uk).
