This article explores soft power from both the United States and Latin American perspectives, analyzing the perceptions of effectiveness for both regions and where they can go from here.
In comparison to the hard, adversarial edge that sometimes erupted at recent presidential-level Summits of the Americas, the Denver meeting was at once more relaxed, more substantive, more free-flowing, and more authentic.
While Panama’s government and security forces are responding constructively to the simultaneous challenges of narcotrafficking, crimes related to Panama’s role as an international logistics and finance hub, gang violence and insecurity, and massive migration flows, matters are arguably not getting better.
Democratic backsliding is occurring in several Latin American countries, and it is not evident that those countries can pivot to a democratic path in the near future.
The UNSC meeting [of 1973] deserves to be more than a footnote in the history of U.S.-Latin American relations and shows how a small state can influence the United States.
If Latin American governments push forward a well-focused, politically pragmatic agenda, the Latin Americanists lying in wait in the administration can be counted upon to pick up the ball.
[Runde’s] view of international development is transformational, where outside assistance can catalyze internal reforms and lead to broad-based economic growth.
In particular, discussions around history tend to ignore the need to teach students about Latin America and the Caribbean and how interconnected the world has become. This hole in the U.S. education system is reflected in a lack of attention to the region in U.S. foreign policy. To bolster engagement with the rest of the Americas, the United States should expand its education system’s coverage of Inter-American history and Latin American studies.
For either CELAC or UNASUR to succeed in the longer term, Lula must help move them away from their ideological roots. Given their histories, this is no easy task, but neither is it impossible.
A more comprehensive, simultaneous, and agile [sanctions] effort to target regime members and enablers remains a powerful option to accelerate a political solution.
