Image Source: Noticias Caracol.
President Petro’s foreign policy aims to elevate Colombia as an aspiring middle power by reducing reliance on the U.S., exemplified by pursuing BRICS membership, growing ties with China, and severing ties with Israel over Gaza. This is a shift in Colombia’s foreign policy that allows for increased partnerships outside of the West.
President Gustavo Petro’s foreign policy seeks to elevate Colombia to become a middle power. He plans to make Colombia into a middle power by asserting greater independence from the U.S. and Europe. Petro’s April 2024 announcement of pursuing BRICS membership during Brazilian President Lula da Silva’s visit and strong rhetoric preceding Colombia’s decision to sever ties with Israel over the escalating conflict in Gaza demonstrate his commitment to establishing greater independence from the West. These actions indicate a significant change in Colombia’s diplomacy as Petro balances alliances with Western nations and potential new partners like China and the BRICS countries.
Colombia has maintained a foreign policy of keeping close relations with Western countries, including the United States and Europe. Colombia’s relations with the U.S. began in 1822 and have had multiple evolutions. U.S.-Colombia relations became strongest in the late 1990s when the U.S. and Colombia fused their interests in counterinsurgency and counternarcotics through Plan Colombia and Peace Colombia. Recently, on May 23, 2023, the U.S. and Colombia elevated their security partnership with the designation of Colombia as a Major Non-NATO Ally. However, depending on the outcome of the 2024 U.S. election, Colombia is likely to entertain more serious overtures from U.S. rivals to further diversify its security and economic alliances.
Bilateral trade is crucial to U.S.-Colombia relations, with the U.S. serving as Colombia’s top trade partner with USD 29.9 billion in trade between the two countries in 2020. U.S. foreign direct investment in Colombia reached USD 7.1 billion in 2022, a 5 percent increase from 2021. Additionally, the U.S. allocated over USD 450 million in 2021 for counternarcotics, security, human rights, and economic development, supporting long-term projects and new initiatives like environmental protection and social inclusion under the Biden administration. These figures demonstrate the deep economic partnership between the U.S. and Colombia. Petro will have to consider additional sources of trade and funding should he decide to step away from the U.S.
Colombia’s ties with the European Union have evolved into a multifaceted partnership covering human rights, environmental issues, trade, digital modernization, and humanitarian aid. The EU, along with countries like Norway and Switzerland, has been active in helping Colombia reduce civil conflict violence.
The EU is also a key trading partner for Colombia, with the EU-Colombia Trade Agreement of 2013 covering trade, tariffs, and labor rights. In 2024, the EU has been Colombia’s third-largest trading partner and second-largest source of foreign direct investment. This partnership is vital for Colombia’s economy, especially as it shifts from extractives to green energy, with EU support crucial for this transition.
However, Colombia appears to be interested in broadening its foreign policy options and has increasingly looked to improve its ties outside the West, including with China and the rest of the BRICS countries.
China has established a significant presence in Latin America, including Colombia, which has so far resisted joining the expansive Belt and Road Initiative. Colombia is one of 12 Latin American countries not participating in the initiative, although it utilizes Huawei’s infrastructure for 5G access. Despite this resistance, China’s investments in Colombia have increased in recent years, and it is likely that these will continue. Previous work by Colombia Risk Analysis provides an in-depth analysis of China’s investment in Colombia’s technology sector. Despite a limited economic relationship, China has become the second-largest destination for Colombian exports. China’s investment in Colombia has surged, especially in hydrocarbons, mining, and infrastructure. The 2013 China-Colombia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), offering protections like free capital transfer and anti-expropriation measures, likely spurred a spike in investment. The BIT continues to attract more Chinese capital to Colombia. The political risks of increased Chinese investment in Colombia are detailed in additional research by Colombia Risk Analysis.
India likewise stands out as a significant potential partner for Colombia as it is on track to become one of the world’s strongest economies by 2030, creating opportunities for Colombia to engage and grow alongside it. Thus far, as we mentioned in a previous article for Global Americans, Colombia has not capitalized on these prospects, resulting in a relationship between the two countries that remains as it has for the past six decades: existent but not particularly advantageous. However, this could change as Petro realigns Colombian foreign policy.
One of the most significant foreign policy realignments Petro has expressed interest in is his desire for Colombia to join BRICS as a full member. Colombia was invited to join in August 2023, and in April 2024, Petro confirmed his intention to pursue full BRICS membership during Lula’s visit, with Brazil supporting Colombia’s bid. Joining BRICS would diversify Colombia’s economic partnerships beyond its top trading partner, the U.S. BRICS represents about 45 percent of the global population, enhancing access to developing markets. Colombia already trades with Brazil, China, and India but has limited trade with Russia, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE. Membership would likely deepen trade with these countries (excluding Russia) and diversify Colombia’s exports.
However, multiple sources contacted by Colombia Risk Analysis have suggested that Colombia’s intention has not yet materialized in formal overtures to join the BRICS, such as sending letters to all member countries or confirming the president’s attendance at the October 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. One of the concerns from BRICS members is that Petro might join the alliance, but his successor’s administration will decide to pull out, similar to how Javier Millei removed Argentina’s bid to join the BRICS once he took power.
Perhaps the best way to understand Colombia’s position in the international order is to label the country as an aspiring middle power. Colombia currently holds some regional influence as the strongest U.S. ally, but Petro is seeking to increase Colombia’s status from that of a middle power and regional leader to that of being a global power broker like Turkey, South Korea, and Brazil. However, he struggles to distinguish Colombia from other leftist governments and remains overshadowed by Mexico and Brazil. Significant regional or international influence during the latter half of Petro’s term is unlikely. The one policy area in which Petro may have a chance to prove Colombia’s value as an international power broker is in its relationship with Venezuela. Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil are currently said to be holding talks with the Venezuelan government and opposition, and, if these talks result in an acceptable solution to the current political crisis, Colombia may be able to distinguish itself as a powerful player in the region.
The Future of Colombia’s Strategic Ambiguity
The 2026 presidential election in Colombia will significantly influence the country’s foreign policy direction. A right-wing president would likely realign with the West, while a left-wing president would continue to move closer to the BRICS countries. Clearer international alignments will be needed, as strategic ambiguity may no longer be viable. While strategic ambiguity has the potential to be a viable policy option for Colombia, the pursuit of strategic ambiguity under Petro has lacked the clear geopolitical strategy necessary for success and has instead been driven by ideological interests, impulsive decision-making, and personal affinity as opposed to political pragmatism that takes into account Colombia’s long-term interests. At this moment, Colombia has not decided about its medium-term alignment with the U.S. Petro’s strategic ambiguity threatens to create a wedge between Colombia and its most important ally, the U.S., without any clear alternatives to replacing the U.S. through new alliances.
Colombia is unlikely to distance itself significantly from the U.S. due to the essential economic and security assistance that the U.S. provides and the economic benefits from the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement. This will, of course, hinge on the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in November. The election of Kamala Harris will likely result in a continuation of the status quo established under Biden and Petro, meaning that the established economic and security partnership will continue without the need for Colombia to seek economic or political realignment. The election of Donald Trump, however, signals trouble for the U.S.-Colombia relationship as there little room for cooperation on security policy and U.S. economic assistance to Colombia may be at risk given Trump’s previous desire to decertify the country and the recent Congressional proposal to cut foreign assistance to Colombia by 50 percent.
Building strong ties with the BRICS countries is likely to take significant time and effort, limiting Colombia’s ability to pivot away from the U.S. in the short term, despite Petro’s intentions. Colombia’s foreign policy is likely to remain strategically ambiguous under Petro, and this demerits the country’s standing as a stable and reliable partner as it becomes unclear whether allies can count on Colombia following through on agreements in the long run. Nevertheless, we expect that Colombia will seek to retain strategic ambiguity in the coming years so as to diversify the country’s alliances and benefit from new partnerships outside of the West.
Sergio Guzmán is the Director of Colombia Risk Analysis, a political risk consulting firm based in Bogotá. Follow him on Twitter @SergioGuzmanE and @ColombiaRisk
Amelia Thoreson was an intern at Colombia Risk Analysis and is a current graduate student at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. You can connect with her at https://www.linkedin.com/in/ameliathoreson/
All opinions and content are solely the opinion of the authors and do not represent the viewpoints of Global Americans.
