War is messy, and consequently, the Russo-Ukrainian War has required Russia to devise a new set of propaganda lines for Latin American audiences.
How are misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda disseminated in Latin America by foreign state media sources and consumed by Latin American audiences, and what are the regional policy implications of such consumption?
There are over sixty—that’s right, 60—candidates competing to become Colombia’s president for the period from 2022 to 2026. Clearly not all of them are going to make it to the final ballot.
La crisis sanitaria global ha generado incertidumbre en la opinión pública, siendo un espacio propicio para la difusión de información engañosa por parte de actores domésticos y extranjeros.
The rising tide of misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda has been well-documented in recent years, particularly as internet access and social media consumption have become seemingly ubiquitous. But in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the scourge of misinformation has intensified, with a cost that can—at least in some cases—be measured in human lives.
Colombian protestors have found an unexpected ally: fans of Korean pop music, or K-pop. What can we learn from their use of hashtags to influence politics?
Andrés Cañizales escribe sobre la desinformación y censura en Venezuela causada por desigualdad de acceso a internet.
El 60% de los venezolanos no tiene una línea móvil activa. Nos alejamos de nuestros países vecinos, ya que Colombia ronda el 130% de penetración y en realidad nos acercamos a los niveles africanos. En el África Subsahariana la penetración de la telefonía móvil es de 38%
Russian-owned outlets have been the chief offenders. The vast majority of misinformation is about Venezuela and U.S.-Latin America relations.
