Photo: The Palacio de San Carlos in Bogota is the main seat of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Source: cancilleria.gov.co.
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In his inaugural speech, President Gustavo Petro revealed his administration’s ambitious agenda for Colombia in its relationship with countries in the Asian and African continents. Petro announced, “[Colombia] will seek greater partnerships with Africa, where we come from… an alliance with the Arab world on the path to transitioning towards new decarbonized economies… [and] link together our Buenaventura and our Tumaco with the rich and productive East Asia.” The president is correct in wanting to broaden the country’s foreign policy toward new horizons—at least beyond traditional allies and partners.
Now more than ever, it is strategically important for Colombia to distribute its eggs among several baskets, thus reducing its dependence on just a few markets in the Global North—some of which are contending with notable slowdowns, greater social fragmentation, and the specter of generalized war. The diversification of Colombia’s relations is also necessary at a time when the global axis of production, consumption, innovation, and cooperation moves toward the Global South, particularly toward the 28 economies of the Asia-Pacific.
Taken together, the Asia-Pacific region’s economies make up 36.2 percent of the global GDP and 52.9 percent of its population, according to World Bank data. Among them are five of the 10 largest countries by population, seven of the 20 most prosperous markets in the world (measured by PPP), and seven of the 25 most innovative societies according to WIPO’s Global Innovation Index. For Colombia, these economies have become key economic partners. In trade, their participation has nearly tripled over the last two decades, going from 9.3 percent of Colombia’s total exports and imports in 2002 to 27.7 percent in 2021. In investment and contracts, the region has also leaped ahead, with China taking the lead.
The new administration is on the right track in its intentions. However, Petro inherits anachronistic structures and postures from his predecessors, incapable of taking advantage of the opportunities and facing the challenges that accompany this “Asia-Pacific century.”
Much of the challenge lies in the limits faced by the institution within the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for handling relations with the region—the Directorate for Asia, Africa, and Oceania (DIAAO). According to Article 15 of Decree 869 of 2016, the functions ascribed to this geographical directorate include proposing foreign policy guidelines in Colombia’s bilateral relation with countries from the region; coordinating and giving instructions to the relevant diplomatic missions; providing support for visits, bilateral meetings, and processes related to new and existing agreements; and maintaining all relevant parties informed about developments in the area, among many others. From a statutory perspective, the DIAAO is not substantially different from two other geographic directorates on its bureaucratic level: the Directorate for America and the Directorate for Europe. However, the differences between these institutions can be gleaned from their very names. The DIAAO does not conduct oversight over one continent, but three. Additionally, these three continents are substantially different from one another and have numerous subregions within them—the Asia-Pacific included —with each demanding a unique approach.
If the directorate’s staff were commensurate in size with the complexity of the geographical area under its responsibility, my outlook would be very different. However, unfortunately, the DIAAO only has a staff of 12 officials—deeply committed to their duties, yes, but few in number—coordinating Colombia’s relations with 102 states in Asia, Africa, and Oceania, 20 of which have Colombian embassies and the remainder being under their jurisdiction. These figures are well above the 57 states under the charge of the Directorate for Europe and the 34 of the Directorate for America.
The result of this profound imbalance manifests itself in several ways, most notably in the directorate being overburdened by the weight of its responsibilities. This is in line with the findings of a job analysis carried out this year by the national government, which found that 61 percent of all the problems that affect the performance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are related to staffing matters (lack of personnel, overload, etc.). It is not surprising, then, that the Foreign Ministry’s quarterly-released management reports often show the DIAAO failing to fully meet its objectives, having an impact on the development of the country’s foreign policy.
Similarly, the imbalance is also evident in the process of allocating resources to the various regions. For example, the office of ProColombia—an agency in charge of promoting international trade and attracting investment—in New Delhi, India, also has to attend to the African market.
It is time for the Colombian government to take the Asia-Pacific region seriously, starting by dividing the DIAAO into an Asia-Pacific Directorate and a Directorate for Africa and the Middle East. This decision is convenient for at least three reasons. First, the changes to the international order that place the Asia-Pacific in its core call for it. In Colombia, a bureaucratic body for Asia, Africa, and Oceania has existed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since at least 1960, with Decree 1632 of that year, which created the so-called Section for Africa and the Orient. The world has changed since then. Colombia should adapt as well.
Second, the example of other countries in Latin America shows that it is necessary to give each region the attention and place it deserves. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru all have directorates or secretariats dedicated to the countries of the region. Many of these are well established, with Mexico having an Asia-Pacific directorate that has existed since at least 1999 and Brazil having established one by 1960. Lumping the three continents into a single body not only distances us from our partners in the Pacific Alliance and others in the region, but it also places our foreign policy structures at the same level as those of landlocked countries, like Bolivia and Paraguay.
Third, the adjustments are easy to carry out from a bureaucratic point of view. It would only take a decree to create a new geographical directorate and a ministerial resolution to establish their new names and functions. Of course, establishing the requisite institutional structures only represents a first step in the right direction. Ensuring the needed diplomatic presence in the two new geographical areas represents a lingering operational challenge. In personnel, the new directorates should be sufficiently staffed in size and experience, including its leadership—which ought to reflect Colombia’s diversity. Strategically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in coordination with other state entities, must develop updated postures to advance Colombia’s interests in each zone.
Nonetheless, taking that first step cannot wait any longer. Failure to make the necessary adjustments is not only disadvantageous for Colombia, but it also opens the country to vulnerabilities—even more so at a time of deepening competition between China and our traditional partner, the United States. The Petro administration leads the country at a historic moment. It does well by implementing reforms that stand up to the momentousness of these times and of its ambitions.
David Castrillon-Kerrigan is research-professor at Universidad Externado de Colombia’s Faculty of Government, Finance, and International Relations, where he researches China-U.S. relations and their impact on Latin America.
