Image Source: AFP
On October 29, 2023, Colombians will go to the polls. Seats for 32 governors, 418 state representatives, 1102 mayors, and more than 12,000 city council members are up for election. With so much at stake and amid a growing dissatisfied and skeptical electorate concerned about the country’s future, the elections will become an unofficial referendum on President Gustavo Petro’s first year in office. Indeed, President Petro is keenly aware that the electoral results will not only impact his political standing but also set the course of Colombia’s political trajectory during the rest of his term as well as a bellwether for the outcome of the 2026 presidential election.
The elections will take place in a context of increasing political violence, lack of information due to poor polling and media coverage in rural areas, and growing political disarray over Colombia’s fragmented party system. Indeed, most Colombians are becoming increasingly pessimistic about the general direction of the country. According to a poll conducted by Invamer in August, 69 percent of Colombians believe the nation is heading in the wrong direction. The same poll revealed that, a large majority of Colombians are concerned about the country’s deteriorating security, the rising cost of living, the escalation of corruption, and the government’s failure to address poverty.
One of the main issues facing President Petro is that he set such huge expectations for his administration during the campaign that now he is grappling with the challenge of meeting those ambitious and difficult-to-attain goals. As he enters his second year, his government’s achievements are largely symbolic, lacking any substantial legislative successes (beyond the 2022 Tax Reform or the approval of his National Development Plan) or tangible enhancements to the lives of Colombians. As a result, his approval ratings have dropped from 64 percent at the outset to 31 percent by August. The unfulfilled campaign promises, ongoing scandals, and a fragile Pacto Histórico have left the administration wrestling with a range of pressing issues, making these elections even more crucial.
For instance, Petro’s government leading “Total Peace” policy exhibits mixed results, advancing talks with the ELN guerrilla group while persistent violence from Clan del Golfo and FARC’s dissidents fuels insecurity concerns. The increase in political violence obeys both the struggle for territorial control between armed groups, and groups currently in negotiations looking to establish a better negotiating position with the government during the peace talks. Despite progress, complexities in the simultaneous engagement of all armed factions and hurdles in implementing the 2016 Peace Accord with FARC dissidents persist.
President Petro’s relationship with traditional political parties (Partido Liberal, Partido Conservador and, Partido de la U) has reached a critical juncture as he has effectively dissolved the political coalition that held on to majorities in Congress. An unwillingness from both the government and traditional political parties to make significant concessions on key reforms such as healthcare, pensions, and labor reforms has led to a stalemate in Congress awaiting the results of the local elections in October to determine if the government or traditional parties will have more advantage as the political balance shifts. This situation has been made more complicated considering that Colombia’s political landscape is experiencing a notable transformation with the proliferation of over 35 political parties, many of which are relatively new entities. Around 20 of these parties, active in the current electoral competition, have been established in recent years.
These factors have strained the government’s ability to deliver on its promises and maintain widespread support among the population. Consequently, the regional elections will serve as a litmus test of public approval for President Petro’s policies and leadership, and the outcome will significantly shape the political landscape moving forward. These elections will hurt the government as they are most likely to favor candidates not aligned with Petro. While the local elections will not predict the outcome of the 2026 presidential elections, and it remains premature to say whether President Petro will become a lame duck after losing the elections, should his party lose the elections, there is a high likelihood of growing tensions between the president and local administrations affecting the government’s ability to deliver.
In sum:
- The 2023 local elections will become a referendum on President Gustavo Petro. Voters will likely use this unique opportunity to react to the government’s handling of the country. If the elections were today, Petro and his coalition parties would stand to lose key cities, such as Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, and Cartagena.
- Lack of voter intention polls will likely affect voter preferences. The scarcity of accurate and comprehensive polling data and media coverage, particularly in rural areas, is likely to lead to a skewed understanding of voting preferences and the electorate’s priorities, creating a vacuum that is likely to be used by malicious actors to mislead and misinform the public. It will also allow candidates to label legitimate polls as “fake,” further misleading the public.
- The erosion of the political party system will likely continue. Political fragmentation may occur after the election as more political parties sprout. The growing number of political parties has made it harder to conduct a clear and concise analysis of the election and its implications. In addition, political fragmentation and first-past-the-poll voting structures make it challenging for any candidate to secure a clear majority, potentially resulting in a less representative government.
- Political Violence is likely to increase as Colombia gets closer to election day. The increase in violence will affect democracy as it hampers candidates’ freedom to campaign and voter turnout, compromising local mayors in some regions. The relationships between candidates and armed groups will taint the legitimacy of some local leaders or constrain their actions.
A potential electoral defeat of the Petro administration will likely lead to an escalation in disputes between the executive and local governments over the next three years. The national government will probably resort to a strategic maneuver of halting, delaying, or conditioning project financing to gain leverage with local governance. This tactic could exert control and minimize the potential fallout from elections that are unlikely to favor them. Such a move will likely cast a cloud of uncertainty over the economy, potentially hampering economic growth and deterring investor confidence. Additionally, introducing such delays will likely erode the nation’s reputation as a reliable investment destination.
In this intricate tapestry of challenges and uncertainties, the outcome of the Colombian regional elections remains a crucial turning point for and the entire nation. Safeguarding the integrity of the democratic process and ensuring fair representation will be imperative to navigate these complex dynamics and sustain the foundation of a strong and vibrant democracy.
Sergio Guzmán is the Director of Colombia Risk Analysis, a political risk consulting firm based in Bogotá. Follow him on X, previously known as Twitter @SergioGuzmanE and @ColombiaRisk.
Enrique Reyes Dominguez is a MA Student at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He was a summer intern at Colombia Risk Analysis. Follow him on X, previously known as Twitter @Enrique_ReDo21.
This piece was adapted from Colombia Risk Analysis’ most recent “Special Report on the Local Elections“
All opinions and content are solely the opinions of the authors and do not represent the viewpoints of Global Americans.
