Photo source: Xinhua.
As the tenth anniversary of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) approaches in September, policymakers and academics the world over will assess BRI’s accomplishments and setbacks. When I served at U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), my colleagues constantly remarked that, when it comes to BRI initiatives, Latin America and the Caribbean will look like Africa in the next five to ten years. I had always taken that comparison with a grain of salt; after all, how can we make such direct comparisons between countries and continents with distinct histories, cultures, and geography? However, after attending the U.S. Army War College China Conference last month, I was amazed by the stark similarities in PRC actors’ problematic engagement in both regions, especially regarding dual-use ports, space facilities, critical mineral extraction, and illegal fishing.
Over the past few decades, Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) have built or helped operate around the African continent. Some of these, such as the port of Bata in Equatorial Guinea and the port of Mandabay in Kenya, draw concern among U.S. security practitioners about potential PLA access in the future. Even if the PLA does not overtly use these ports for military purposes, it can use them for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. For instance, SOE port operators could collect information about U.S. naval ships docked at these ports, including what parts break down, the size of ship crews, and training and maintenance techniques. In Latin America and the Caribbean, there are at least 17 deep-water ports owned or operated by some of the same Chinese SOEs in Africa. Many are located around important sea lines of communication like the Panama Canal, the Strait of Magellan, and the Caribbean basin.
Another is space facilities. China is allegedly building a space port in Djibouti, a country where China already has a military base. Hong Kong Aerospace Technology and Touchroad will construct the project, and it includes a space satellite, rocket launch pad, and adjoining infrastructure. In the Western Hemisphere, China has 11 space research ground stations in South America, including the famous Espacio Lejano in Neuquen, Argentina, which was built by a subsidiary of the PLA Strategic Support Force. While Chinese and Argentine authorities have said the station is being used for civilian space research, U.S. military officials are concerned that its satellites can potentially spy on U.S. and allied space activities.
Then there is the hunt for critical minerals like lithium. Just months ago, Chinese company Ming Xin Mineral Separation Ltd beat out Tesla for a bid to develop Nigeria’s first lithium processing plant. It is only the latest example of Chinese companies attempting to corner the African market for lithium, copper, cobalt, and nickel—key minerals for mobile devices and electric vehicles. That same trend is happening in South America, home to 60 percent of the world’s lithium reserves. Chinese companies like Ganfeng, Zijin, and Tianqi have poured millions into lithium mines in Argentina and Chile, and a Chinese consortium called CATL just won a bid to extract lithium in Bolivia.
Finally, massive Chinese trawler fleets are decimating fishing stocks, robbing local communities of $2 billion each year and causing environmental harm. Across the Atlantic, Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina are facing the same threat of Chinese illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing. It is no surprise then that both regions sought to curb these activities by calling upon their strength in numbers. West African countries are working with the UN and NGOs like Environmental Justice Foundation to track IUU fishing and come up with solutions, while Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Panama have signed an agreement called CMAR to jointly protect their marine areas from IUU fishing.
Civil society and government leaders from both regions can learn best practices from each other as well as work through pitfalls to avoid when dealing with the Chinese government and various Chinese entities. In fact, some Caribbean leaders are already taking the lead. Barbados has already hosted the AfriCaribbean Trade and Investment Forum, and its leaders have met with several African leaders in recent years.
Lawyers, businesspeople, and journalists from both regions should increase exchange and organize joint fora too. The revelation of the contract in Kenya, which laid bare China Export-Import Bank’s often opaque and unequal business practices, was made possible only by the concerted and sustained effort of Kenyan lawyers and businesspeople. Their Latin American and Caribbean counterparts could use some of those lessons to demand more transparency of the various Chinese projects in their region. These stakeholders can also consider creating an open-source database tracking Chinese SOEs, including instances of corruption, environmental damage, or any direct ties to the PLA. That information will help local decisionmakers avoid awarding bids to Chinese companies with poor track records elsewhere in the world.
The U.S. can also play a supporting role. For instance, an interagency team could conduct a “CFIUS roadshow” around both regions. Country leaders may be interested in learning about how the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. is structured and implemented. They may even choose to create their own CFIUS-like agencies to screen potentially problematic Chinese investments in their own countries.
SOUTHCOM and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) should also hold regular staff talks and conferences—not just between commanders—but also between their intelligence, operations, and policy directorates, and even down to the defense officials working at various U.S. embassies in both regions. Staff should also share Chinese engagement trends to discern patterns of behavior and success stories of U.S. projects in their country or region that can be replicated elsewhere.
Most importantly, U.S. leaders must realize that, more often than not, the U.S. is not the best voice to call out malign Chinese behavior or influence activities. Instead, it would be far more effective to step back and help facilitate connections between African and Latin American and Caribbean counterparts and listen to the lessons their partners have learned about dealing with China. After all, the fate of both regions should be decided by the African, Latin American, and Caribbean people, not by the U.S.-China strategic competition.
Leland Lazarus is associate director for national security at Florida International University’s Jack Gordon Institute of Public Policy and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. He formerly served as special assistant and speechwriter to the commander of US Southern Command and as a U.S. State Department foreign service officer in China and the Caribbean.
