Allison Fedirka | January 19, 2024
Image Source: Stratfor.
All eyes in were on Ecuador earlier this month when the Noboa government responded to a massive security crisis. While the problems have been brewing for years, the pinnacle moment occurred on January 9, which included prison breaks, a highly publicized hostage situation and a government-declared state of emergency. Though some order has since been restored, the country is far from resolving its deeply rooted security threats. Fully resolving the country’s security issues is a lofty goal given the many constraints facing the government in this endeavor.
Organized crime is rather commonplace throughout the region. Yet, the events in Ecuador raised alarm bells among other Latin American governments, indicating that concerns go beyond the threat of potential contagion. Events in Ecuador touched on deeper fears that any country in Latin America could suffer a similar criminal uprising and would face constraints similar to those now confronting Ecuador.
The concerns over an Ecuador repeat in other countries is more than valid given the reach of organized crime groups and prison conditions in the region. Mexican cartels—namely the Sinaloa and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CNGJ)—have permeated most of the cocaine trade in Latin America. Brazil’s First Capital Command (PCC), Comando Vermelho, and Familia do Norte also preside over significant drug and black market trafficking routes in the region. Many of the criminal groups in other countries have ties into these larger organizations and their business operations.
Overcrowded prisons is a regionwide problem. Most countries are well over their prison capacity. Brazil tips the scales at 174 percent capacity—for reference, Ecuador operated at 112 percent at the time of the incidents. Less than a handful of countries operate under 100 percent capacity, and even then, are pushing the upper limits, like Chile, at 91 percent. Such conditions facilitate organized crime groups operating within detention facilities and undermine the power of security forces.
Furthermore, the transnational nature of organized crime puts Latin American governments, like Ecuador, at a disadvantage. First, organized crime groups tend to have a strong presence in rural areas, supplanting any state presence. Geographic barriers and economic models based on resource extraction for export have segmented many rural communities and cut them off from the central government and urban areas. Illegal, criminal groups step in to fill the void. In the event that outside powers assist in defeating these groups, the host government faces the potential threat of this outside support assuming power in those areas rather than the government itself.
Second, governments and their respective security forces must act within their borders or receive special permission to act beyond them. This puts limits on the extent to which they can independently pursue criminal groups, many of which have resources and presence in other locations outside of Ecuador’s immediate jurisdiction. While regional cooperation for security is possible on paper, the competing interests and concerns of different governments makes it a direct challenge. One need only look at the Venezuelan migration crisis in South America to understand how each country quickly gave up a coordinated regional response in favor of protecting national borders and economies.
The institutional dynamics between Latin American governments and respective security forces also discourage certain actions for cracking down on crime and restoring public order. Although they left power a generation ago, the military regimes which governed in the 70s and 80s left a large portion of the current population with a historical memory of military rule. Many remain suspicious of government overreach. Consequently, no sooner than emergencies are declared, the public discussion begins over an exit strategy, which is often not apparent and rarely stated.
There also remains large public concerns over excessive use of force to restore order and potential for security threats to spiral out of control. As a result, governments like Ecuador must account for public opinion and concern when executing security measures in an effort not to stoke political unrest.
Additional constraints arise from the fact that most countries in Latin America do not have the funds or capabilities to single-handedly take on transnational criminal groups. Fighting crime requires liquid funds, many of which are in short supply or governments do not have. Immediate funds are needed to beef up security operations, while long-term funds are needed to help with economic projects to address underlying issues spurring crime. Many Latin American governments find themselves needing some level of outside security support since they lack sufficient internal funding for robust security operations, in addition to the economic projects that aim to help improve underlying living conditions. This scenario places governments in a paradox of necessitating money to fund long-term security solutions, but the security issues discourage outside money from entering the country.
Relying on outside support sits uneasy with many Latin American governments given their fear of external powers interfering with domestic affairs. Historically speaking, the U.S. has been the country to most frequently step in to fill the role of security guarantor in the region. Having a track record of interference in regional affairs during the 19th and 20th centuries, most Latin American countries want to closely manage Washington’s reach into security and keep them at a safe distance. While Ecuador has identified the United States (and Israel) as primary security partners, the government also accepted military help from Argentina and 35 other countries in a move that helps reduce dependence in the U.S. to some degree. Furthermore, Ecuador has made it crystal clear that it considers the current problem an internal issue, a clear message that it does not want outside interference and one that will resonate strongly with its neighbors.
Responses by other Latin American countries were as much about supporting Ecuador as they were about domestic consumption. Peru declared its own state of emergency in the north in an effort to prevent any violence spillover and border infiltration by criminals fleeing Colombia and Ecuador. Colombia finds itself in the difficult position of being home to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), which has marked influence and has played a significant role in Ecuador’s criminal scene. Inevitably, Colombia will feel the impact of Ecuador’s response measures, particularly following Quito’s decision to repatriate criminals in jails to their country of origin, which for many is Colombia.
Argentina offered to send security support to Ecuador. This signals that the Milei government takes civil unrest enforcement seriously and is not afraid to take action. Chilean President Gabriel Boric’s remarks emphasize rule of law, a message for all in the region about the importance of dealing with security issues in a constructive manner and without abuse of power. He also recognized Chile was not exempt from similar risks and that greater action was needed for social reintegration programs and funding for the penitentiary system.
While organized crime and violence is a region-wide problem, a series of constraints prevent a region-inclusive solution. Ecuador serves as a cautionary tale because it is an example of the constraints Latin American governments face for confronting the shared endemic problem of transnational crime. Any number of Latin American countries could be the next Ecuador.
Allison Fedirka is a Senior Fellow at Global Americans, Director of Analysis at Geopolitical Futures, and co-founder of the Allonia Group.
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