Issue
A January 2017 report “The State of Housing in Central America” from Habitat for Humanity and the Latin American Center for Competitiveness and Sustainable Development (CLACDS) put Guatemala’s housing deficit at an estimated 1.54 million homes. That gap, though, if recent weather patterns and their effects are any indication, is only likely to grow, and the most affected will be the poor. According to Guatemala’s Ministerio de Comunicaciones, Infraestructura y Vivienda de la República de Guatemala (CIV) the country’s housing deficit has grown by 39 percent in the past six years.
To give just one example, the Guatemalan government’s disaster prevention agency CONRED (La Coordinadora Nacional para la Reducción de Desastres) estimates nationwide that 500,000 families are at daily risk of a landslide or mudslide through climate-related events or natural disasters. This is on top of the thousands of homes damaged or destroyed annually by flooding and landslips such as in Panabaj in 2005 or El Cambray Dos in 2015.
Sixty one percent of the homes in Guatemala have been determined to be inadequate— defined as houses that lack basic services (drinking water or sewage) or that require improvements such as floors, ceilings or walls—a total of more than 1.5 million homes in the country. Guatemala’s rural areas are the most affected with almost 1.1 million houses requiring substantial repairs. For every new house that needs to be built there are three that require repairs.
Guatemala’s current population may be as high as 16.9 million according to latest United Nations estimates. If correct, then the housing deficit of 1.54 million may well be on the conservative side. With such a huge deficit, NGOs and charities are struggling to fill the space and focus on specific local solutions and projects. Habitat for Humanity is possibly the largest housing charity at work in Guatemala, and they have built almost 60,000 homes since arriving in the 1970s—just a tiny fraction of what is needed
There’s also the difference between rural and urban homes that face different challenges. Building regulations vary from municipality to municipality. There are 340 municipalities in Guatemala and their zoning codes range from well ordered with oversight to virtually non-existent.
Peri-urban areas are where Guatemala’s poor have traditionally internally migrated to. But the flattest land around cities has already been developed leaving these new displaced with the option of land invasions of disused or underused land or building in dangerous areas. These include building precarious homes on steep-sloped ravines, under bridges or next to landfill sites. In the capital, Guatemala City, this migratory push has created unplanned urban sprawl with zoning laws failing to keep up with the new pressures. The result in Guatemala City today is the sprawl along Carretera a El Salvador in the east to Mixco in the west and the haphazard spill into the capital. Guatemala’s INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística) and CELADE (Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía) project that the country’s population will see a move from 57% rural in 2000 to more than 75% urban in 2032, meaning that cities will need to absorb an extra 6 to 7 million people.
Extreme weather caused by climate change will only increase these strains internally and lead to a great push for out migration.
Interplay of Extreme Weather and Policy
El Cambray Dos (2015)
During the evening of October 1, 2015 heavy rains triggered a landslide in the El Cambray Dos neighborhood of Santa Catarina Pinula that borders Guatemala City. At least 280 people were killed, over 200 homes destroyed and the site was declared a red zone and later uninhabitable.
There had been warnings about a potential disaster going all the way back to 2008, and in 2014 CONRED (the National Disaster Agency) recommended that residents leave. Rainfall had weakened the hills overlooking El Cambray Dos, and drainage for Santa Catarina Pinula flowed out of the same area. Without any flood defenses around the River Pinula, there was also the danger of local flooding.
Heavy rainfall and rapid drying creates cracks in the foundations of houses, which is what happened at El Cambray Dos. This was exacerbated by sloppy oversight and poor regulation on where the houses were built. Planning permission was given to houses directly underneath the town’s sewage system outfall point, which was built underneath the city’s municipal graveyard.
Panabaj/Tzanchaj (2005)
On October 5, 2005, these small Mayan villages near Lake Atitlán were victims of a landslide, triggered by torrential rain from Hurricane Stan. The rain dislodged mud from a volcano that flowed down into the villages.
The mudflow was reported as being half a mile wide and 15-20 feet deep and delayed rescue attempts for two days.
The death toll is believed to be over 1,000, although the lack of accurate population data and access to the villages made it difficult to determine.
Panabaj mayor Diego Esquina attempted to have the area declared a graveyard. But, families have since returned to the area and, with international aid, built three new communities Chuk I, II and III on top of the rubble.
Puente Belice
The Puente Belice connects some of the poorest zones of Guatemala City, namely Zonas 6, 17 and 18. Over 63,000 vehicles use it on a daily basis. More than 330 families live under the bridge, having invaded the land when it was opened in 1958.
The Guatemalan human rights prosecutor—the Procurador de los Derechos Humanos (PDH)—filed a lawsuit demanding that the government address the precarious living conditions of the communities living under the bridge. In 2010, rumors of the bridge’s imminent collapse began to circulate. While the CONRED had been warning about the community’s risk since 2003, in 2010 it declared the area uninhabitable. Currently the government has budgeted $10 million to study the bridge’s structural status and $10 million for its maintenance, but only after flags had already been raised for at least seven years
The reason in part is because the residents are still considered illegal land invaders. As a result, the Guatemala City council has resisted assisting them. And Mayor Alvaro Arzú is wary of being seen to legitimize the invasion. Nevertheless, he agreed to a semi-formal census that asked how many homes had access to electricity and water in May 2016. The results are still pending
Initial plans for a new bridge over the communities that would cost $150 million and presumably protect them from a weather related tragedy have been submitted to CIV but financing the plan will require the Guatemalan Congress to approve a loan—a direct consequence of the failure of prevention and zero maintenance on the bridge since 1958.
Preparations for the Future
Guatemala’s future revolves around three plans: the Plan for Prosperity from the United States; the intermediate cities project based on a similar, successful initiative in Colombia; and Ka’Tun 2032 a Guatemalan government roadmap for national development starting in 2014. The latter explores Guatemala’s urban/rural populations, health, education and social protection policies, economic data, and its natural resources. A leading theme of Ka’Tun 2032 is respecting multiculturalism and the defense of human rights in an effort to reduce poverty and address the needs of the population. The intermediate cities project is a public-private partnership to stimulate economic development in cities outside Guatemala City that holds the potential of lower internal migration to the already busting at the seams capital city.
An example of intra-institutional cooperation in Guatemala is CONRED’s use of INSIVUMEH (Instituto Nacional de Sismología, Vulcanología, Meteorología e Hidrología) weather data to target the most vulnerable settlements, both in the metropolitan Guatemala City area and in rural areas. International weather and risk data is used in conjunction with INSIVUMEH’s and includes topography and other geographical data to give a picture of at-risk communities, mainly in Guatemala City. Prior to that the Environmental Ministry (MARN) used a relief map that was decades old; and resources such as maps from the 1970s are common sights in Guatemalan ministries.
The effort is also examining earthquake data, such as from the United States Geological Survey and geological studies. The most recent research effort was a team from the Universities of Cambridge and Bristol in England who examined Guatemala’s volcanoes, especially the Fuego volcano using drones. Already this year, Fuego has erupted dozens of times, covering land and houses in four of Guatemala’s 22 departments with ash and sand. It also deposits sulfur on houses making their roofs liable to leaking and causing health problems.
However, this type of assistance has been localized and a lack of resources has prevented the program from being extended nationwide. At the same time data alone haven’t been sufficient for even those communities studied. Though the agencies have identified areas most likely to be affected by floods, landslides or foundation weaknesses, many residents have chosen to remain despite being warned of the imminent danger of a natural disaster by CONRED. Sometimes this is due to a lack of options; others fear theft or the government; and others don’t move because they don’t believe the risk. Enforcing an evacuation takes time and legal measures involving CONRED and local and/or national authorities that delays the process of helping people at risk.
Since the 1976 earthquake, engineers in Guatemala have been trained in the Seismic Safety Commission/seismic building code standards of California. In theory, buildings constructed under the codes should be able to withstand most earthquakes. In practice, the lack of oversight and different regulations means that only the middle and upper classes in Guatemala City live in the buildings that enjoy such guarantees.
In the case of El Cambray Dos, the Guatemalan government attempted two unique policies. The first was to use a finca owned by a convicted narcotics trafficker to rehouse the surviving victims in a community called Querida Familia (Dear Family). However, more than 18 months later, Querida Familia’s houses have yet to be finished due to a lack of funding. An investigation by Guatemalan prosecutors (Ministerio Público) into who ordered the houses at El Cambray Dos to be built is ongoing. This is a legal first to attempt to hold public officials accountable for a natural disaster, but whether it will bring charges is still in doubt.
In 2015, Carlos Tabush, head of the Fondo de Hipotecas Aseguradas (FHA) along with CIV and the Asociación Centroamericana de Vivienda (Acenvi) highlighted opportunities in social housing. Primarily in urban areas, their ambition was to provide homes at $24,500 per unit. Tabush called on developers to stop focusing their attention on the market that is charging over $100,000 a house. For now, however, it has remained simply a call for more housing with little action behind it.
What’s lacking?
There is no specific ministry to deal with housing, and it is currently part of CIV’s charge to deal with Guatemala’s infrastructure. Although there are plans for a Ministry for Urban Development and Housing, they have not come to fruition. This has left a gap in governmental structure to deal with the housing shortfall, to regulate building codes at a municipal level and to help ensure access to financial instruments such as mortgages.
Hard data on Guatemala’s population is difficult to come by as the last census was in 2002. Guatemala City’s population is estimated at 2.5 to 3.5 million but could be more. The Guatemalan government does not track internal migration statistics so the capital’s population is guesswork. For the first time in Guatemala’s history, there are more urban residents than rural. Agriculture accounts for roughly 35% of Guatemala’s economy in 2017 but in the 1950s it was over 70 percent. Guatemala City’s urban plans date from 1972 and have not been updated despite the population increasing roughly fivefold to date.
There’s a lack of prevention both in Guatemalan culture and governmental budgets, especially CONRED’s. Although coordination occurs once there’s an emergency, planning for the future after a tragedy has already occurred is rare. There’s no uniformity on how to share experiences and haphazard follow up. For example, after the 2005 Panabaj disaster, there were consultations at a variety of grassroots levels but none led to the standardization of disaster management or housing policy.
There’s also no structural policy on how to deal with climatic events and climate change discussion remains at an academic/expert level.
In addition, despite being an Inter-American Development Bank theme for Central America and the Caribbean for years under Luis Alberto Moreno there is still no “solidarity fund” for housing. The idea of social insurance where countries would contribute and draw out after a disaster ended up being a risk assessment fight. Countries at lower risk than Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador came up short in their contributions. As a result, the current system requires countries suffering a natural disaster to ask the World Bank or IDB to redirect existing loans for emergency funding rather than count on a pre-existing, dedicated pool of funds. Such funds would be used to pay for repairs, infrastructure, social costs, and future adaptation strategies. But for now, not only does the pool of funds not exist, there are no loans specifically available for such efforts,
One consequence of four-year governmental periods, both at the national and municipality levels, is a lack of long-term planning. Re-election is possible at the municipality level but since Guatemala restored democracy in 1985 there has been a ban on re-election of presidents. The problem would be less severe if there were coherent and consistent political parties. But in Guatemala, none of the parties that contested the 1985 election exist today. The result is a lack of policy consistency and ability to see long-term projects through to conclusion.
Projected Consequences of Inaction
Currently there are 360,000 families living in the metropolitan area of Guatemala City who are at risk of a catastrophe on the scale of El Cambray Dos every day. In Guatemala as a whole, according to CONRED, 500,000 families are at risk of becoming homeless, suffering injury or dying due to natural disasters.
A lack of urban planning coupled with increased internal migration to cities would put more families at risk. As the projected 6 to 7 million migrants move from rural to urban areas, they will be forced to build in at-risk areas such as the community underneath Puente Belice in Guatemala City’s Zona 6, placing them in danger of both natural and manmade disasters.
What should be done?
- Develop a comprehensive map of housing needs and demographic patterns. Data-driven analysis of urban populations would allow effective policy to direct public resources to at-risk areas and address the needs of the most vulnerable. The lack of an accurate census for 15 years severely handicaps the government’s ability to plan and react to the rural-urban move.
- Create the proposed Ministry for Urban Development and Housing. This would clarify governmental responsibility and allow for clearer accountability and policy making.
- In conjunction with the new ministry for Housing, there needs to be two new institutions to supervise housing in Guatemala. One would regulate housing construction, building codes and finance. The other would be the financial vehicle to give more Guatemalans access to safer housing.
- Create a nimble, targeted agency to help support housing for the most needy. An estimated 90% of the housing market is made up of people who are either too poor to buy a house or not capable of financing their first home. Only an estimated 40% of Guatemalans have a bank account. There needs to be a clear policy on social housing in the form of subsidies for those that cannot pay.
- Press on with the intermediate cities plan to focus on regional cities such as Cobán, Quetzaltenango, Coatepeque, Retalhuleu, Mazatenango, Puerto Barrios, Zacapa, Flores, Puerto San José, Huehuetenango and La Antigua. Guatemala needs to be ready for the continued urbanization of its population which includes the above cities as well as the capital Guatemala City. A project has already started; its success needs to be guaranteed.
- Standardize municipal zoning and construction laws. This would speed up housing development and simplify the process to enable projects for the country’s poorest. Such an effort needs to involve all levels of government—national, departmental and local municipalities—in creating policy for a rural-urban transitional population.
- Clarify communication about the dangers of climate change on housing. The first wave of knowledge—at an academic/technical level—has not moved on sufficiently since the 1970s. There is public awareness of issues such as where houses are built, access to services, natural disasters and climate change but it is variable and very little awareness of the future risks caused by extreme weather.
- There needs to be a linear path from knowledge-communication-public action and a move from risk information to public discussion and policy making. Within a year national media has changed from highlighting hailstones as oddities in Guatemala to highlighting its effects on crops and houses. But this needs to be translated into a more forward-looking, policy-focused analysis and set of proposals for the government’s responsibility and policy options.
