Photo: Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdogan and Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro pose after a joint news conference in Ankara, Turkey, June 8, 2022. Source: Reuters / Umit Bektas.
Venezuela used to be a country with a proactive foreign policy profile. Yet, since 2013, the Venezuelan political system has become increasingly authoritarian, and its foreign policy has changed dramatically. In March 2013, the death of the then president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, was announced. The announcement followed several weeks of speculation about Chávez’s health and his stay in Cuba for medical treatment. Nicolás Maduro, appointed by Chávez himself as his vice-president and successor in case of his absence, was tasked with announcing the news. In the months and years since then, Venezuela has seen contentious presidential elections, dissatisfaction with the government, repression, nationwide protests, and economic and social turmoil.
In this changing scenario, few experts examined the implications of the 2013 succession on Venezuelan foreign policy and the role that Nicolás Maduro had previously played in Venezuelan foreign policy. This has produced frequent misunderstandings about Venezuelan foreign policy since 2013 and led many scholars to overlook the value that foreign policy has held for Maduro’s political survival.
To understand Nicolás Maduro’s particular approach to foreign policy, it is important to remember that Maduro was the longest-serving foreign relations minister to Hugo Chávez, a role he held for six years. Even as Maduro remained in office, other members of Chávez’s inner circle were either removed or reshuffled. Nicolás Maduro turned out to be the ideal foreign minister, balancing prudence, pragmatism, and a personalistic vision of the government to carry out Chávez’s foreign policy objectives. Maduro carried out negotiations to promote Latin American integration schemes such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and Venezuela’s entry into Mercosur. As foreign minister, Maduro also strengthened Venezuela’s relations with China and Russia, an effort he had cultivated since he was a member of the National Assembly. He represented the Venezuelan government on the international stage when Chávez was absent, including in the context of the war in Syria (2011) and the 2012 Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia. Maduro’s experience in the international arena is far from negligible.
For a while, after Maduro gained power in 2013, he closely aligned his foreign policy with that of his predecessor. For a time, Maduro inherited everything from Chávez, from a hegemonic political party to a web of international alliances. However, soon after, the government began to face with economic turmoil combined with fuel, medicine, and food shortages. All this contributed to a humanitarian crisis that has moved Venezuelans to migrate to other countries, particularly in Latin America.
After nine years in power, Maduro’s legacy in foreign policy can be seen as a mixed bag of wins and setbacks for the government. Maduro’s wins in foreign policy have largely allowed him to stay in power even as the majority of his country wishes him removed from power. His setbacks, meanwhile, have generally hurt both the government and the people. These wins and setbacks must be understood in the context of progressive changes in domestic and international conditions. In terms of Maduro’s foreign policy wins, first, since 2013, Maduro has broken ties with regional institutions that would otherwise restrain him. In 2017, Venezuela was indefinitely suspended from the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), and Maduro announced that Venezuela would withdraw from the Organization of American States (OAS). Although this may not seem a total win for Maduro, these steps allowed him to break ties with the inter-American system, which has repeatedly and publicly criticized Maduro’s authoritarian rule and the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela.
Second, while part of the international community has accused Maduro of being a dictator who uses his power to jail opponents and repress Venezuelan citizens while doing little to ameliorate the country’s humanitarian crisis, authoritarian regimes like China and Russia have leaned toward Venezuela and defended the government of Maduro when possible. For instance, in 2017, China and Russia boycotted an informal U.S.-led meeting at the United Nations to discuss the escalating crisis in Venezuela and the threats it posed to the Western Hemisphere. Later, in February 2019, China and Russia vetoed a U.S. draft resolution at the UN Security Council, arguing that a solution to Venezuela’s political crisis should be peaceful and free from international intervention.
The relationship between China and Venezuela has grown since roughly 2003 due to Venezuela’s policy of strengthening ties with extra-hemispheric and anti-U.S. leaders, as well as China’s gradual insertion into global politics. Venezuela has received large amounts of money from China, making it one of the world’s main recipients of Chinese loans. Although Beijing generally remains loyal to Maduro, the political, social, and economic crises have created uncertainty for China. Due to turmoil in Venezuela, China has extended fewer lines of credit to the Maduro government, and subsidiaries of Chinese companies have even sued the government of Maduro for not fulfilling contracts.
Likewise, relations between Russia and Venezuela grew closer in the early 2000s as the two countries shared a rhetorical commitment to multilateralism, anti-Americanism, and the potential for mutually beneficial agreements. Although Maduro has been a strong ally of Russia, the 2022 war in Ukraine has opened opportunities for Maduro to slowly reapproach the United States. Let’s not forget the complicated diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and Venezuela, which saw a turn in 2008 when Chávez expelled the U.S. Ambassador in Caracas. This was followed by the expulsion of most top U.S. diplomats from Caracas, and eventually, Nicolás Maduro’s 2019 decision to break diplomatic relations with the U.S. and order all U.S. diplomatic personnel to leave Venezuela. It is still unclear and too soon to speak about how much Maduro will benefit from recent talks with U.S. envoys in Caracas. Nevertheless, the reality is that Russia looks far more distant from the Venezuelan government now than the United States. If the war in Ukraine continues and there is still a desire in Washington to reapproach Maduro, Maduro could keep talks going with the U.S. government.
Maduro’s growing ties with illiberal states have been critical amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Given Venezuela’s complicated relationship with the U.S., the Venezuelan regime only approved and received vaccines from China (Sinopharm and Sinovac), Russia (Sputnik-V and Sputnik), and Cuba (Abdala and Soberana). During the pandemic, Maduro was also able to boost alliances with authoritarian leaders both within and outside the region of Latin America, including Iran and Turkey.
In this context, there are also setbacks we can find in Maduro’s foreign policy. First, oil revenues have fallen since 2013, and these challenges have carried over into foreign policy. Venezuela, a country highly dependent on oil production and the international oil market, has been impacted by the reduction of oil production and the collapse of oil prices in 2014. Even as oil prices have risen sharply since 2020, the Maduro regime’s mismanagement of the oil sector has prevented the government from benefiting, except for illegal activities that have proliferated under state sponsorship. This has impacted social spending as well as Venezuela’s regional influence through oil, including regional schemes like PetroCaribe, Petrosur, and PetroAndina.
Second, many countries, including Canada, Colombia, the European Union, the United States, and Switzerland, have applied sanctions toward Venezuela, even as others have remained silent. These sanctions have reduced the ability of Maduro’s inner circle members and their families to conduct financial transactions and travel to certain countries. However, Maduro and some members of the Venezuelan government have been able to circumvent these sanctions and create a network of connections with leaders, businesses, and groups in China, Cuba, Iran, Kuwait, North Korea, Syria, Russia, and Turkey.
Third, Nicolás Maduro does not have a charismatic personality, which has inhibited his international ambitions. While Hugo Chávez was a proactive leader, constantly seeking international alliances and alignments, the reality is that Maduro has been able to rely upon some but not all of the connections already created by his predecessor and the few he has been able to build himself (e.g., with Turkey). Thus, new efforts at consolidating regional schemes, influencing the regional landscape, or elevating Venezuela’s role in world politics have been marginal under Maduro’s regime.
Of course, the coming months will provide more evidence on how the Maduro government can do more in foreign policy than react to international and domestic conditions. Oil companies are waiting to operate at full capacity in Venezuela. Maduro keeps signing agreements with close allies willing to aid Venezuela or those that are facing a similar sanctions regime as Venezuela. Latin America is entering a new political wave with the election of leaders who could offer Maduro the possibility to actively reconnect with the region, particularly Gustavo Petro of Colombia. Time will tell how Maduro carries on his foreign policy amid these changing circumstances.
Adriana Boersner Herrera is Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Department of History, Political Science, and Philosophy at the University of South Carolina Aiken. Follow her on Twitter at @AdriBoersner.
